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Abstract 
 
Ever since Oscar Jászi’s thesis on opposing centripetal versus centrifugal forces within the Austro-
Hungarian empire, historians have perceived developments within the Dual Monarchy through a 
dichotomous lens without questioning this assumed mutual exclusivity. This has led to singular 
interpretations of imperial loyalty, Kaisertreue, as a purely centripetal, read imperial, force. While new 
studies have shown that the opposition between nationalism and imperial identity is much more 
complex and that in some cases they could be compatible and even mutually supportive, this has not 
led to a new interpretation of Kaisertreue. Through an analysis of the promotion of Kaisertreue during 
two imperial visits to Galicia in 1880 and 1894, this thesis argues that the ruling Polish conservatives 
nationalised dynastic loyalty in order to support their nationalist visions and policies for Galicia, while 
at the same time the Habsburg Court continued to promote an anational Kaisertreue based on the 
equality of all nations, languages, and cultures. This reinterpretation helps historians to better 
understand the complexities of imperial-nationalist dynamics and therefore offer better explanations 
of developments within Austria-Hungary. 
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Introduction 
 
“Stets hat der Monarch unsere Aufgabe leichter gemacht, den Er gestattete es in fester 
und glänzender Weise, dem in uns gelegten Vertrauen zu entsprechen, ohne dass wir es 
nöthing hätten, den natürlichen Rechten und angeboren Gefühlen untreu zu werden und 
Er brachte das Alles in Einklang mit dem Wohle der Monarchie. Auf diese Art ermöglicht 
Er uns die Anknüpfung inniger, ja freundschaftliger Verbindungen mit den andern Völkern 
Oesterreichs.”1 
 
This quote comes from a German edition of CZAS, a Polish conservative newspaper from west Galicia. 
Within this article, Anton Klobukowski, the chief editor, described why the Galician Poles were loyal to 
emperor-king Franz Joseph of Austria-Hungary, also known as  Kaisertreue in German.2 In this specific 
part, the monarch is described as the protector of the rights of national cultures and languages, while 
simultaneously making it possible for them to feel connected with the other peoples of the Dual 
Monarchy. In other words, nationalism and dynastic loyalty were considered to be compatible and 
linked. 
This is interesting, because ever since Oscar Jászi, a former Hungarian Minister of National 
Minorities and historian who emigrated to the United States, first wrote about how Austria-Hungary’s 
“centripetal forces of a supranational consciousness were more and more disintegrated by the 
centrifugal forces of national particularisms”3, historians have continued to characterise the Dual 
Monarchy’s history by these supposedly mutually exclusive forces and failed to question whether the 
assumption of this “inherent opposition between national consciousness and imperial loyalty” is 
correct.4  
 Perhaps the reason is that conceptual history, or Begriffgeschichte, is not popular with 
historians, as they tend to consider historical research as studying that which is individual and specific, 
while leaving theory and concepts to social and natural scientists. However, studying concepts and 
defining them is important as they help to “experience and to interpret history, to represent or to 
recount it.”5 In the words of Reinhart Koselleck, one of the founders of conceptual history: “There can 
                                                             
1 In: CZAS nr. 200. Auszüge in deutscher Uebersetzung (31-08-1880), 1. Found in the Haus-, Hof- und 
Staatsarchiv (HHStA) Vienna, Neuere Zeremonial Akten (NZA), Karton 367. 
2 Crone, C.L., Casus Imperii: Enige Aspecten van de Ondergang der Dubbelmonarchie 1867-1918 (Universiteit 
van Amsterdam 2017), 118, 125. 
3 Jászi, O, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, (Chicago 1929), 4. 
4 Cole, L. and D.L. Unowsky, ‘Introduction. Imperial Loyalty and Popular Allegiances in the Late Habsburg 
Monarchy’, in: in: L. Cole and D.L. Unowsky (eds.), The Limits of Loyalty. Imperial symbolism, popular 
allegiances, and state patriotism in the late Habsburg Monarchy (New York 2007), 1-10, 2. 
5 Koselleck,R., The Practise of Conceptual History. Timing History, Spacing Concepts (Stanford 2002), 22-23. 
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be no history, no historical experience or interpretation, no representation or narrative without social 
formations and concepts by means of which […] they define their challenges and seek to meet them.”6 
How can one explain developments or events if one does not understand the concepts by which 
people, in the period under analysis, used to define the world around them? Conceptual history is 
about questioning the current interpretation of concepts, because “despite continual use of the same 
word, the political and social language has changed” over time. 7 Moreover, based on the principle of 
‘semasiology’, concepts can have different meanings at the same time.8 Begriffgeschichte aims to 
“identify the social scope of concepts” and look at their influence on political and social groups.9 
Therefore, conceptual history prescribes that in order to create a better interpretation of history, 
historians should “theoretically formulate in advance the temporal specifics”10 of political and social 
concepts in order to better interpret historical sources and to explain history. 
 As stated, within the historiography on nineteenth and twentieth century Austro-Hungarian 
history, scholar´s main assumption has been the opposing centripetal and centrifugal forces. Their 
focus has therefore mainly been on the increasing radicalisation of nationalism and the assumption of 
“a parallel diminishing of popular imperial loyalties”, such as Kaisertreue.11 Nevertheless, new studies 
have shown that there was often an overlap in loyalties and identities within the empire, i.e. imperial 
and national loyalty are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Daniel Unowsky, for instance, shows that 
nationalist movements and dynastic loyalty could actually reinforce each other and in some cases even 
depended on each other for survival. According to him, the Galician elites used imperial loyalty and the 
monarchs personal popularity to legitimise their rule, while the Habsburg dynasty and their imperial 
state relied on elite loyalty and participation within the imperial institutions.12 Moreover, another 
study by Peter Hának on Hungarian imperial and nationalist celebrations, concluded that there was a 
complex relationship between identities and loyalties. He argued that there was a national identity, in 
which the primary bonds were language and ethnicity, and a supranational identity, defined by loyalty 
to the dynasty and positive acceptance of the multinational empire. Markian Prokopovych defined this 
                                                             
6 Koselleck, R., ‘Social History and Begriffsgeschichte’, in: I. Hampsher-Monk, K. Tilmans, and F. van Vree (eds.), 
History of Concepts: Comparative Perspectives (Amsterdam 1998), 23-36, 25. 
7 Kosseleck, The Practise of Conceptual History, 5. 
8 Hampsher-Monk, I, K. Tilmans, and F. van Vree, ‘A Comparative Perspective on Conceptual History – An 
Introduction’, in: I. Hampsher-Monk, K. Tilmans, and F. van Vree (eds.), History of Concepts: Comparative 
Perspectives (Amsterdam 1998), 1-10, 2. 
9 Bödecker, H.E., ‘Concept -  Meaning – Discourse. Begriffsgeschichte reconsidered’, in: I. Hampsher-Monk, K. 
Tilmans, and F. van Vree (eds.), History of Concepts: Comparative Perspectives (Amsterdam 1998), 51-64, 51 
10 Kosseleck, The Practise of Conceptual History, 4-5. 
11 Unowsky, D.L., ‘Celebrating Two Emperors and a Revolution. The Public Contest to Represent the Polish and 
Ruthenian Nations in 1880’, in: L. Cole and D.L. Unowsky (eds.), The Limits of Loyalty. Imperial symbolism, 
popular allegiances, and state patriotism in the late Habsburg Monarchy (New York 2007), 113-137, 113. 
12 Unowsky, D., ‘Dynastic Symbolism and Popular Patriotism. Monarchy and Dynasty in Late Imperial Austria’, 
in: J. Leonhard and U. von Hirschhausen, Comparing Empires. Encounters and Transfers in the Long Nineteenth 
Century (Göttingen 2011), 237-165, 238. 
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relationship as people having one nationality, but multiple loyalties.13 With this in mind one can better 
explain the fact that during late Habsburg rule, nationalist confrontation coexisted with an 
unprecedented increase in official and popular manifestations of imperial loyalty. 14 
Consequently, historians’ assumptions on the mutual exclusivity of imperial and national 
loyalties are false, or at least it is much more complex. As they have consistently identified Kaisertreue 
with the empire’s centripetal forces, historians have only defined this concept from that perspective. 
Based on the semasiologic ideas of conceptual history in which concepts can have different meanings 
at the same time and the new studies that show that people could have different loyalties at the same 
time and that sometimes nationalism and imperial loyalty can be made compatible, this thesis argues 
that the concept of Kaisertreue should be revisited and be reinterpreted from an anational and 
national perspective. Based on the work of Ellen Comisso, this thesis will argue that in the case that 
national identity was compatible with imperial loyalty, Kaisertreue could be claimed by the nationalists 
to legitimise their ‘national goals’ by utilising it in a national narrative. Moreover, this nationalist 
interpretation did not necessarily oppose the ‘classic’ promotion of dynastic loyalty by the Habsburg 
Court. It could be mutually beneficial as long as elites and dynasty could cooperate and the nationalists 
had an interest in participating within the imperial framework.   
In order to make this argument, this thesis shall focus on how the Habsburgs and nationalists 
exploited Kaisertreue for their own goals by analysing two Kaiserreisen to Galicia in 1880 and 1894. 
Galicia serves as an excellent case for this analysis, because it was one of the more recent additions to 
the Habsburg Monarchy and even though the political elite was initially considerably antagonistic 
towards Habsburg rule, by the end of the nineteenth century they were considered to be one of the 
pillars of the Cisleithanian half of the Dual Monarchy and among the most Kaisertreu of the emperor’s 
subjects. On the other hand, the Poles were fiercely nationalistic and propagated the Polish language, 
heritage, and symbolism. The public celebrations could therefore be ‘hijacked’ with different agendas 
to the official promotion of the dynasty as the living embodiment of state unity.15 
By describing the political motives and interests that were at stake both from the side of the 
Habsburg Court, the Cisleithanian government, and the Galicians, how these interests were made 
compatible within the Kaiserreisen, how the ceremonies were staged, and how the Kaiserreisen were 
politically interpreted, this thesis will point out that the participating parties had different 
interpretations of Kaisertreue and that historians should therefore revisit the concept in order to 
                                                             
13 Prokopovych, M., Habsburg Lemberg. Architecture, Public Space, and Politics in the Galician Capital, 1772-
1914 (West Lafayette 2009), 39. 
14 Cole, L., ‘Differentiation of Indifference? Changing Perspectives on National Identification in the Austrian Half 
of the Habsburg Monarchy’, in: M. van Ginderachter and M. Beyen (eds.), Nationhood from Below: Europe in 
the Long Nineteenth Century (Basingstoke 2012), 96-119, 110.  
15 Unowsky, ‘Dynastic Symbolism and Popular Patriotism’, 242.  
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better understand the dynamics between the imperial centre and the Crownlands in the Austro-
Hungarian empire. The question of this research therefore is: To what extent was there a different 
interpretation of Kaisertreue between the Habsburg Court, the Cisleithanian government, and the 
Galician ruling elites and how did this manifested itself during the two Kaiserreisen made by emperor 
Franz Joseph to Galicia in 1880 and 1894? 
The political interpretations of Kaisertreue by political factions in Vienna and Galicia can be 
analysed with the help of  Viennese daily newspapers of different political leanings (the liberal Neue 
Wiener Zeitung, Neue Freie Presse, and Neues Wiener Journal, the conservative Das Vaterland, and the 
governmental Wiener Zeitung and Fremden-Blatt for instance), documents and telegrams from court- 
and (local) governmental officials found in the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, the Kriegsarchiv and the 
Allgemeine Verwaltungsarchiv in Vienna, Unowsky’s analysis of the Polish and Ruthene news coverage 
of the two Galician Kaiserreisen (Polish: CZAS, Gazeta Narodowa, and Dzienik Polski, and Ruthene: 
Slovo and Dilo) - which were published in languages not mastered by this author - and secondary 
literature on the historical and political context of late nineteenth century Austria-Hungary, 
Cisleithania, and Galicia as well as specific events, like the 1894 Galician Exhibition. 
A special note must be made about the Unowsky’s impressive work on Habsburg imperial 
celebrations in Cisleithania. Even though his analysis of the local political and nationalist reception of 
the  Kaiserreisen by the emperor to Galicia leads him to conclude that the Galician Polish elites tried 
to legitimise their nationalist vision and policies for Galicia by linking it to Kaisertreue, he does not 
discuss the implications this has for the historical understanding and interpretation of this concept. 
Nevertheless, his analysis of Galician Polish and Ruthene newspapers and of other sources from the 
archives of Cracow and L’viv (Lemberg), will be very useful and will be utilised throughout this thesis. 
Before analysing the two Kaiserreisen however, this thesis will first deal with the 
historiography on Kaisertreue and the evolution of the debate on Austro-Hungarian history in chapter 
1. Then, in chapter 2, based on conceptual history’s strategy to formulate the concepts in advance of 
analysing them, the differences between nationalism and anationalism will be discussed, as well as 
their interpretation, and the promotion of Kaisertreue will be detailed. Chapter 3, will follow with an 
overview of the 1867 Ausgleich, and the political context in Cisleithania, and Galicia after 1867. Finally, 
chapter 4 and 5 will analyse the two Kaiserreisen to Galicia in 1880 and 1894 based on the political 
motives of the Court, the Cisleithanian government, the ruling Polish conservatives, the liberal 
opposition in the Reichsrat, and the Polish and Ruthenian opposition; how their interests were made 
compatible; what happened during the visits themselves; and how they were politically interpreted. 
Finally, this thesis shall end with a conclusion discussing the implications, and the bibliography.  
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Note on terminology and geographic names 
The use of geographic names requires a short elucidation. Cities, provinces, areas, nations, and states 
often had different names in different languages. For instance, Lemberg was also called Lwow or L’viv. 
Using a certain name implies a certain perspective. Bohemia was called Böhmen by those who spoke 
German and Čechy by the Czechs. Čechy thus implies to exclude the Germans and vice versa. The same 
goes for the Hungarian half of the Dual Monarchy where the term Magyar implies the Hungarian 
nation, not the other nationalities in Transleithania.  
 For practical reasons this thesis will use English terminology insofar that Anglicised versions of 
the names exist, otherwise the German form shall be used, because German was the bureaucratic 
language of Cisleithania. For example, the capital Cisleithania shall be referred to as Vienna, not Wien, 
and the Galician capital shall be called Lemberg, not L’viv or Lwow. In the case that a name was changed 
or that it is more known in another language, this shall be noted parenthetically, i.e. Preßburg 
(Bratislava).  
 Secondly, when referring to the Habsburg Empire as a whole the term ‘Austria’ cannot always 
be used since the meaning of the term changed with history. Before the 1867 Ausgleich, Austria 
referred to the entire empire, but afterwards it only referred unofficially to the Western half of the 
Dual Monarchy, which was officially called Die im Reichsrat vertretenen Königreiche und Länder. In 
order to be as clear as possible, this thesis shall reserve the term Austria or Austrian empire to refer to 
the period before 1867 and refer to Austria-Hungary, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Dual 
Monarchy, or the Monarchy after the Ausgleich. Furthermore, the western half shall be referred to as 
Cisleithania or ‘the Austrian half’ and the eastern half as Transleithania, Hungary, or ‘the Hungarian 
half’. 
 Thirdly, within Galicia the two largest nationalities were Poles and Ruthenes. ´Ruthenian´ is a 
term that is used in Austrian newspapers and sources to refer to the Ukrainian population within the 
empire as opposed to those living in the Russian Empire. ‘Ukraine’ or ‘Ukrainian’ will be used when 
referring to the language or their national movement.  
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1. Historiography 
 
Historians have traditionally focused on patterns of development and decline within Austria-Hungary. 
Their discussion rested on the increasing strength of nationalism, and calls for self-determination, 
versus the power of centripetal forces like Kaisertreue. Within the historiography on Austria-Hungary, 
there are therefore basically two schools of thought: those who argue that the monarchy’s 
disintegration was due to international factors, i.e. World War I and that internal problems could have 
been overcome, and those who believe that internal national, political and structural problems would 
have caused the disintegration of the monarchy. The problem with this is that many scholars thus 
perceived the Dual Monarchy’s collapse as predetermined and they assumed that decline had settled 
in and was inevitable.16 In this chapter, the development of these two schools within the Habsburg 
historiography will be discussed, as well as the main considerations on Kaisertreue. 
 
1.1 The Belle Époque and the Great War years 
The main discussions in the historiographic debate on the Habsburg Monarchy start with two men: 
Louis Eisenmann, a French professor at the Sorbonne,17 and Henry Wickham Steed, a British journalist. 
Eisenmann was an academic who wrote his doctoral-thesis on Le compromise austro-hongrois de 1867 
in 1904. His conclusion was that the empire had to reform itself, because dualism did not work 
well/anymore. He proposed three far-going reforms: the reestablishment of absolutism, a national 
reconciliation in the Cisleithanian half (mainly between Germans and Czechs), which could however 
lead to tensions Hungarians who would see this as a violation of the Ausgleich, or national autonomy 
within the frame of a unitary state.18 While not in the original dissertation, another writer, Fuscien 
Dominois, wrote in 1937 that Eisenmann had stated that: “elle [the Dual Monarchy] remplir sa mission 
européenne en assurant la justice à tout les peoples de la vallée moyenne du Danube, ou elle est 
condamnée à disparaître.”19 Dominois claims that Eisenmann’s conclusion that the empire would 
disintegrate if it could not treat all its people’s equally, had been correct. However, this statement 
cannot be found in the original text and it was probably done so in hindsight. Nevertheless, Eisenmann 
was one of the first to speak of imperial decline and the possibility of the monarchy’s end. 
                                                             
16 Barkey, K., ‘Changing Modalities of Empire: A Comparative Study of Ottoman and Habsburg Decline’, in: J.W. 
Esherick, H. Kayali, and Eric van Young eds., Empire to Nation. Historical Perspectives on the Making of the 
Modern World (Rowman & Litlefield Publishers, Inc: Oxford 2006), 167-197, 167. 
17 Mares, A., ‘La vision francaise de l’Europe Centrale du XIX au XX siècle‘, in: Les Cahiers du Centre de 
Recherches Historiques (1991), 7, 1-12, 5. 
18 Eisenmann, L., Le compromise Austro-Hongrois de 1867. Étude sur le dualism (Paris 1904), 668-669 and 
Mares, ‘La vision francaise’, 6.  
19 Dominois, F., ‘Louis Eisenmann’, in: Revue des Études Slaves (1937), 17:3-4, 240-244: 241. 
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 Henry Wickham Steed was not an academic like Eisenmann, but more of an activist, being 
employed during the Great War to create propaganda “designed indirectly to undermine and destroy 
the Habsburg Empire.”20 As a correspondent for The Times in Vienna, and from 1913 as a contributing 
editor on foreign affairs, he wrote (often critically and with anti-Semitic accusations) about the Austro-
Hungarian Empire.21 Nevertheless, it was he who was one of the first to describe the importance of 
dynastic loyalty: 
 
“The idea of an " Austrian " nationhood, with its uniting virtue, is lacking, nor is the want 
supplied by what is called the "State idea”. […] Gesamtpatrtotismus, or patriotism 
embracing the whole Monarchy, is the privilege of a few. Such "soul" as "Austria" 
possesses is mainly dynastic; and the principal bond between the Hapsburg peoples is 
devotion to the person of the Monarch, who, ruling by right Divine in various 
constitutional guises, is the chief factor in each State separately and in both States jointly. 
The Dual Monarchy depends upon the Crown more fully and more truly than any other 
European realm. The dynasty is not only the pivot and centre but the living force of the 
body-politic. The Army, the Navy, the Bureaucracy and, in a sense, the Church are dynastic 
projections. "Austria" can only "find herself" when her aspirations run parallel to those of 
the dynasty, or when dynastic purpose coincides with popular necessity.”22 
 
With this observation Wickham Steed clearly considered dynastic loyalty to be the most important 
unifying factor in the monarchy. Something that would become very influential later on in the 
academic debate.  
1.2 The Interbellum 
In the Interbellum both schools within the historiography are started off by those in the post-
dissolution successor states. The new states (Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) focused on their own 
‘national’ histories and many scholars considered the Dual Monarchy to have been a ‘prison of nations’ 
which ignored and supressed the legitimate demands of the different Völker. 23  They presented 
themselves “as the natural and inevitable outcome of peoples “struggling to be free” of the empire in 
which they had previously been encapsulated.”24 Their research therefore mainly concluded that the 
empire had to disintegrate because of the (rightful) rise of nationalism.  
                                                             
20 Cornwall, M., The Undermining of Austria-Hungary. The Battle for Hearts and Minds (London 2000), 176.. 
21 Ibidem. 
22 Wickham Steed, H., The Hapsburg Monarchy (London 1913), xiv. 
23 Crone, Casus Imperii, 13. 
24 Comisso, ‘Empires as Prisons of Nations’, 138. 
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 Then there were also scholars living within the Austrian rump-state. They often felt more 
closely linked with Germany and rather focused on a Großdeutsche Geschichte than on Habsburg 
history. This ‘Germanised’ version of history made them look exclusively through a Viennese and 
Austro-German perspective and therefore ignored the ‘nationality problem’. Instead they ascribed the 
disintegration of the Dual monarchy to losing the Great War and/or (depending on their political 
opinions) blamed the Hungarians, nationalists, socialists, and freemasons. 25  Hungarian historians, 
meanwhile, differed between both camps, depending on their political opinions. 
 Both schools of thought originated from these first politically motivated historic works from 
Europe. Nevertheless, it were émigrés like the earlier mentioned Oscar Jászi and Josef Redlich, the last 
Austro-Hungarian finance minister, who went to the United States, who published the first academic 
works about the Dual Monarchy, albeit quite critically. Jászi had been a liberal Hungarian politician 
who disapproved of both conservative and nationalist politics in Hungary after the Ausgleich. After the 
Great War he emigrated to the U.S. and became a professor. In his influential book The Dissolution of 
the Habsburg Monarchy (1929) he opposed those who argued that the “collapse was purely a 
mechanical process” 26  by stating that the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy “grew out of the 
inevitable logic of a long series of social causes” and that the medieval-like collection of countries was 
without any common ideal or feeling that could have been the foundation for solidarity.27 With this 
book, Jászi has continued to influence historians’ assumptions of ‘centrifugal’ and ‘centripetal’ forces. 
 Redlich, who also emigrated to the U.S. to become a professor, focused less on both forces, 
but blamed the continued influence of the Habsburg dynasty for the disintegration of the empire. In 
his political diary, Das österreichische Staats- und Reichsproblem, he argued that they saw the realm 
as their personal property and that this collided with democratic government. 28 In another book he 
wrote: “So stellt sich der Kaiser as Regieren vor: Ernennen unt Enlassen von Ministern nach seinem 
Gutdünken!“29 Despite his criticism, his work did emphasize the important role of the dynasty.  
 The rise of fascism and autocracy in 1930’s Europe did spark a more positive interest from U.S. 
scholars for Austria-Hungary. The Anschluß of Austria by Nazi Germany caused American historian and 
former Habsburg subject, Hans Kohn, to argue that the Monarchy had been “an important and 
necessary factor for the stability of Europe” and that its disintegration “opened the way for the 
domination of central and central-eastern Europe by Berlin and gave Germany a chance for expansion 
                                                             
25 Crone, Casus Imperii, 13. 
26 Jászi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, 7. 
27 Idem, 7, 33, 129. 
28 Redlich, J., Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria. A Biography (New York 1929), 352 
29 Fellner, F. (ed.), Schicksaljahre Östereichs 1908-1919. Das politische Tagebuch Josef Redlichs. II Band 1915-
1919 (Graz 1954), 201.  
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along the Danube unhoped for by even Bismarck.”30 Thus, while many European historians either 
ignored the Dual Monarchy, perceived it as a prison of nations, or saw it through a ‘Germanised lens’, 
émigré historians in the United States seriously began studying it, leading to many new publications.  
 
1.3 The post-war debate 
Carel Crone argues in his PhD dissertation that post-war historiography on the Habsburg Empire was 
determined by five (chronological) factors. 31  The first is that the post-Habsburg successor states 
created a power-vacuum in central-eastern Europe which was filled by Nazi-Germany and the Soviet 
Union. This changed the overall historical perspective on the Dual Monarchy from highly critical to a 
somewhat more positive view.32 Secondly, nationalism was blamed for the two world wars while 
scholars wrote more positively about the multinational Austro-Hungarian Empire which had lasted for 
centuries. Even the much criticised Ausgleich of 1867, though caused by nationalism, had 
accommodated the nationalist Hungarians for fifty years. After 1945 and the academic backlash 
against nationalism, the Dual Monarchy was therefore viewed more positively. 
The third factor was the cultural, economic, monetary, social, and political integration of 
western Europe. This prompted some historians to have a new look at historic European empires which 
included many nations, cultures, faiths, and/or lands. The Dual Monarchy gained renewed interest 
and, unlike in earlier works, it was not perceived as an obstacle to modernisation and the legitimate 
rise of the nation, but as a framework wherein peoples had lived together for centuries. Some 
historians like Istvan Deák and Alan Sked even argued that the European Union might even learn some 
lessons from the Dual Monarchy, despite the massive differences. 
 The fourth factor that renewed interest and influenced the debate on Austria-Hungary, was 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. This led to a new focus on the 
causes for disintegration of empires. Historians started to focus more on the final years of the Dual 
Monarchy, the causes for disintegration, and the relationship between empires and (pseudo-)national 
states.  And finally, the fifth, factor was the development in economic historical research, which 
concluded that the Dual Monarchy’s economy was growing fastest amongst European powers and that 
its economy, financial, and banking services were much more internally integrated than thought 
before.33 
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1.3.1. Austro-American school versus Anglo-French school 
After 1945, the Habsburg empire was largely ignored by European historians, who focused instead in 
the Interbellum and the causes of the Second World War and its atrocities. In the post-war years, 
research on Austro-Hungarian history therefore continued to be done by American historians. It was 
only during the 1950’s that Austrian scholars renewed their interest in these “lost years” of imperial 
history as a means to distance themselves from Germany. 34  The interaction with their American 
colleagues developed into, what Helmut Rumpler calls, an Austro-American Historical School.35 This 
group mainly focused on elite rule and the political, social, economic, cultural and national 
developments in the Monarchy that was quite different from pre-war studies in that it perceived the 
multinational empire more positively. Furthermore, the Austro-German perspective was exchanged 
for a more multinational perspective. 
 Not long thereafter, French and British scholars also started analysing the Habsburg Empire. 
Their historical school differed from the Austro-American one in that it focused mainly on the external 
relations of Austria-Hungary with the rest of Europe and its influence on internal policy-making.  
According to Crone, this was mainly based on the British historical perspective to see European history 
as a balance of power. The Anglo-French school was less dominated by émigrés from the Habsburg 
lands than the Austro-American one and therefore they might have been less inclined to research the 
internal developments as opposed to the external. Their studies often highlighted the more ‘positive’ 
developments and the strength of the centripetal forces, which enabled Austria-Hungary to continue 
being a great power. 36  As the post-war academic debate mostly focused on the causes of the 
disintegration of the Dual Monarchy, two opposing explanations came to be: those who argued that 
there was a turning point from ‘flourishing empire’ to decline37and those that argued that the empire 
fell because of external factors. 
 One of the most important historians from the Austro-American school was Robert Kann. He 
did not consider Austria-Hungary as an anachronistic, autocratic relict, but argued that the despite its 
problems, the centripetal forces often came out stronger than the centrifugal ones. Nevertheless, Kann 
argued that nationalism would have certus an, incertus quando38, sometime but surely, caused the end 
of the empire, but only when the people lost their trust in the imperial institutions, such as the dynasty, 
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the bureaucracy, and the army.39 Kann thus reframed Wickham Steed’s conclusion of people’s having 
to follow the interests of the dynasty into the Habsburgs being dependent on their people’s trust and 
loyalty. This was a new definition, which implied a more active role by the dynasty to win over their 
subjects’ hearts and minds. 
Alan Taylor, an influential historian from the Anglo-French school, countered Kann’s 
conclusion. Considering Wickham Steed’s observation, he was of the same opinion that  Austria-
Hungary was in the first place a tool for the Habsburg dynasty to have a place at the European 
diplomatic table. The peoples served the dynasty, not the other way around. In his book he wrote this 
down as “In other countries dynasties are episodes in the history of the people; in the Habsburg Empire 
peoples are a complication in the history of the dynasty.”40 He claimed that the Habsburgs actively 
pursued a policy of ‘divide and rule’ between its peoples so that only the dynasty would unite them. 
No supranational state which could compete for the peoples’ loyalty, should ever exist or develop. 
Only the monarchy and the dynasty should unite them. Or, in Taylors words: “Only “the August House” 
was permanent.”41 
Taylor’s perspective is indirectly countered by Alan Sked, who is interestingly also from the 
Anglo-French school. He argued that the Dual Monarchy was a successful example of a multinational 
state, and that most nationality problems were solved by 1914. According to him most nationalities 
did not consider separating from the empire and that the Habsburgs were not in the business of divide 
et impera. Moreover, Sked argued that the empire’s population was still very loyal to the dynasty and 
that they only argued for a better position for themselves within the imperial state. 42 
American scholar, Arthur May, build on this by describing the widespread popularity of the 
monarch with the different nations. He stated that “not only was this person the focal objective of 
political loyalties, for Austro-Germans and Magyar, for Slav and Latin, but he embodied the common 
concern for law and order. Symbol of unity and dynastic patriotism, Francis Joseph had lent a special 
inspiration to the realm of many tongues, and to speak critically of him in the open was akin to 
sacrilege.”43 May argued that Franz Joseph was considered to be the guarantor of national rights, of 
equality before the law, and that this was what made him very popular with the different nations in 
his realm. This implies that the monarch had to actively portray himself in this manner to the 
population. 
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 Other historians also took a closer look at Franz Joseph and the Habsburg dynasty, with many 
blaming them for the empire’s problems, like Helmut Rumpler who argues that the emperor was 
reluctant to let go of power and appointed statesmen with weak personalities who were unfit to 
reform the empire44, or Carlile Macartney, who argued that the ‘dynastic plan’ of an anational empire 
had failed, with only the court, the upper echelons of the bureaucracy, high ranking clerics, the officer 
corps, and a part of the aristocracy upholding the Habsburg identity.45 Solomon Wank, an American 
historian, also writes on this lacking supranational identity, which could “have coordinated particular 
national loyalties with loyalty to a supranational political identity.”46 Loyalty to the emperor meant, 
according to Wank, nothing more than loyalty to Franz Joseph personally, not the Habsburg dynasty 
or the empire as a whole. His conclusion was that the Habsburgs only barely acknowledged the force 
of nationalism to such an extent that they could preserve their control over the territories and it status 
as a great power. This acknowledgement amounted to limited decentralisation leading to the 
formation of nationalist constituencies which vied with the imperial centre in Vienna for power and 
influence over the population, “thus accelerating imperial decay”.47  
 This lack of a supranational identity or the relative weakness of the centripetal forces 
compared to those of nationalism, is often recognised by historians. Nevertheless, their opinion differs 
on the power of Kaisertreue. Peter Sugar, also an American historian, for instance considered dynastic 
loyalty one of the more successful Habsburg policies, saying that it did preserved the state “for much 
longer than one would have had a right to expect” and that it made “most national groups seek, almost 
to the last days of the monarchy, a solution for the grievances within the state rather than in 
secession. 48   Dutch scholar Carel Crone also recognises this, but does point out the decreasing 
relevance of traditional unifying forces, like Kaisertreue, in the modern, industrialised, and urban Dual 
Monarchy after 1880. He concludes that the state kept promoting dynastic loyalty, while it’s unifying 
force was dwindling.49 
 Even though these scholars belong to the Austro-American or Anglo-French schools, their 
conclusions were quite different. There were those who saw the inner strength of the empire, but also 
those who recognised its structural problems. Then there were also those who were divided on the 
stability of the Dual Monarchy within the international system. Nevertheless, they seem to agree on 
Kaisertreue as a strictly imperial and unifying force, even though its strength and relevance is the 
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subject of intense debate, especially when combined with discussions on the power of nationalism, 
the accommodation of nationalities’ demands, dynastic interests versus state interests, continuing 
political dominance of the nobility, identities and loyalties of the population,  and modernisation.50 
 
1.4 The historiographic gap 
These two historiographic schools were heavily criticised in more recent literature. In a commentary 
by Phillip Ther, historians are denounced for focusing too much on the supposed anachronism of 
empires, like Ernest Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism, which even speaks of “Ruritania” when talking 
about empires, implying their backwardness.51 Ther criticises these historians who are ignorant or at 
least lack attention for ‘the imperial’ in nationalism studies. 52  This all added to an academic 
atmosphere that accepted that empires had to fall in favour of nation-states. He therefore comes up 
with ‘imperial nationalism’. His argument is that “there were national movements who struck a 
coalition with the empire and its dynasty” and anti-imperial movements that either tried to break away 
or agreed with a compromise. 53 Ther bases this on the fact that even when imperial nations were in 
clear opposition to imperial rule or imperial policies, “the emperor and the dynasty, the military or the 
imperial high culture could still serve as objects of identification.”54  
 The implication of Ther’s argument is not only the compatibility of Kaisertreue and 
nationalism, and therefore the end of the dichotomous assumption, but also that they could 
strengthen each other. Unowsky’s analyses of the official representation of emperor Franz Joseph in 
imperial celebrations in Cisleithania, seems to support Ther’s argument. Unowsky discusses the 
Galician Polish nationalist coalition with the empire and the dynasty, while other national forces within 
Galicia, like the Ruthenes, also sought to identify with the Habsburgs and the monarch.  
 Based on this, it can be argues that historians have too often assumed imperial decline through 
nationalism due to a focus on macrohistorical developments like state modernisation or world 
systemic changes. Karen Barkey calls this a broad, macro-perspective, where large-scale state actions 
are considered without attention to the more micro-interactive dynamics between state and society 
actors.55 Moreover, these interactions are not just political, they’re also based on the complexity of 
different overlapping loyalties and identities within the imperial context. Nationalism and imperial 
loyalty did not need to be mutually exclusive. Nationalism was not always directed against the empire 
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and discourse against the imperial state did not necessarily represent the views of most within the 
national groups.  Neither did the Cisleithanian half try to create an encompassing collective identity 
forcing their peoples to choose between their loyalties. The truth is much more complex. Crone 
describes the Dual Monarchy as a Vielvölkerstaat, a multi-ethnic, multicultural state that encompasses 
several Völker, with each striving towards their own cultural identity as a nation, but without a 
supranational state identity.56  
 These criticisms, studies, and ideas on identity lead to the question is whether the concept of 
Kaisertreue has not also been singularly perceived through a macro-perspective, without attention for 
the dynamics and bonds between centre and periphery. As seen in the quotation from CZAS, 
nationalist interests and dynastic loyalty could be compatible. It is therefore necessary to take a new 
look at the concept and see whether it should be reinterpreted as heaving different meanings.  
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2. Nationalism, anationalism, and Kaisertreue 
 
2.1 Nationalism  
One cannot deny that nationalism became a major force in the formation of politics and loyalties in 
late nineteenth century Austria-Hungary.  According to Ellen Comisso, a professor in political science, 
nationalists and the imperial government both influenced the loyalties and identities of the empire’s 
peoples. She identified five options for individuals to cope with the complexity of imperial-nationalist 
loyalties and identities: 1) Insurrectionism/nationalism, 2) pragmatism/accommodation, 3) 
collaboration/assimilation, 4) parochialism, and 5) anationalism.57  
The first category refers to those who actively strove towards secession from the Habsburg 
Monarchy and form an independent sovereign state, like the Italian irredentists who actively sought 
to unite themselves with their ‘nation-state’.58 However, “not every triumphant nationalist had as his 
primary goal the establishment of a nation-state.”59 The second group therefore, consist of nationalists 
that considered insurrection to be too costly and extreme to find popular support. They advocated a 
policy of accommodation or pragmatism, which meant to maximise the benefits of being within the 
empire while working to consolidate (and strengthen) their cultural and linguistic heritage. They 
perceived the Monarchy as the appropriate area in which to fulfil their national aims and therefore 
rejected separatism. Through participation in imperial institutions, they were rewarded with having 
their own language in local politics, administration, and schooling, gaining subsidies for cultural 
institutions, and sometimes even autonomy.60 Then there was also a third option in which individuals 
gave up their nationality and assimilated into the culture and language of the ruling classes of the 
empire.  
 The last two categories refer mostly to the masses, whose attitudes were mostly not politicised 
and more often relied on parochialism, i.e. the relationship between lord and village rather than nation 
and state, or on ‘anationalism’, defining themselves based on class, occupation, or confession. Social 
democratic parties for instance were open for all nationalities and their programs were based on class, 
not nationality, while Christian Socials were to some extent also open to all nationalities with the 
condition of faith. The success of these parties rested in part on the willingness of imperial authorities 
to tolerate them though, something that was often problematic because of the elite fear of uprisings 
against their authority, which, according to Comisso, often caused them to collaborate with the 
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imperial state, despite their nationalist interests, to secure their local control. Moreover, it might even 
have influenced elite assimilation to some extent.61    
 Comisso’s different options are interesting in that she has identified a grey area between 
separatism/nationalism and assimilation: pragmatism and accommodation, while parochialism and 
anationalism shows either the indifference towards or the unwillingness to be defined by nationality. 
This is supported by scholars such like Tara Zahra or Pieter Judson, who questioned the effectiveness 
of nationalism, arguing that it lacked the social and cultural resonance often attributed to it. 62 
Comisso’s pragmatism/accommodation is however to be understood as  an elite movement, as in a 
“specific political programme or ideology, usually involving some form of claim to autonomy.” 63 
Nationalist loyalty, in this context, was not just based on idealism, but on a calculation.64 It therefore 
recognises Prokopovych’s earlier mentioned assumption that people could have different loyalties, 
despite having one nationality.  
Austrian historian, Peter Haslinger, came up with the concept of territoriality to understand 
these different loyalties. According to him one must look at the imperial, national, and regional levels, 
in order to study of changing patterns of allegiance and senses of belonging, without privileging the 
concept of nation.65 The concept of loyalties enables scholars to address the issues of how the state 
fitted into the matrix of identities at the individual or group level. Contrary to the assumption on the 
inherent opposition between national consciousness and imperial loyalty, which was unquestioned by 
most historians using Jászi’s thesis of centrifugal and centripetal forces66, the emerging nationalist 
movements did have an overlapping, but complex and ambiguous relationship with Habsburg state-
building. Nationalism was often utilised by the Habsburg state to bolster imperial allegiance, while 
nationalists used the imperial framework for their own purposes. Some scholars criticise this by 
arguing that all was well if the interests were compatible, but that when nationalist leaders found 
conflicts between national and dynastic interests, they gave preference to the former.67  
Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, there was little demand for independence among the 
various ethnic groups and political groupings that actively called for separatism and national freedom 
were very marginal. Instead, nationalist goals were primarily focused on achieving more autonomy 
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within the framework of the imperial state 68  or the right to participate in the imperial state 
institutions.69 Sked support this assertion, by writing that: 
 
“The national leaderships had to concentrate on the immediate questions of the day. 
Most of these concerned practical questions such as the franchise and the language of 
administration and education. Thus, despite the fact that in some cases there was indeed 
much dissatisfaction with Habsburg rule, the nationalities directed their attention 
primarily to the issues that directly affected their daily lives [or that of their constituents]. 
No major leader or party called for the destruction of the monarchy.’”70  
 
It is hardly surprising that nationalists’ demands for more autonomy had a linguistic side to them. If 
politics goes on in a foreign tongue, possibilities for participation in public life are limited. Local diets 
that claimed to represent a specific nationality wished to have an administration in that nation’s 
language. Not only would this allow for more control, but also – to their minds- it would create a more 
legitimate government because the population understood the rules they had to follow.71 The battle 
between nation- and empire-building was therefore mainly one of control.  
 
2.2 Anational imperialism  
The Habsburg Monarchy has been described “as a monarchic union of estates-dominated 
Crownlands72  with its structure remaining “multi-cultural or poly-ethnic” rather than becoming a 
multi-national state. 73  Its cohesive bonds remained dependent on premodern concepts, such as 
dynastic loyalty and religious identities.74 Historians argue that in most states the importance of these 
‘anational’ cohesive forces declined in favour of more modern ones, like economic growth, 
nationalism, or democracy.75 Anationality means here refers to the antithesis of nationalism, i.e. ‘non-
national’ loyalties, like religion or dynastic loyalty. In other words, anational cohesive forces were not 
in competition with national values and interests.  
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Furio Cerutti, an Italian professor of political philosophy, defined four elements of an anational  
supranational identity: interdependence, normative universalism, global challenges, and 
institutionalisation, and he excluded national elements like a community of language and the 
homogeneity of communities. 76  According to him, a network of interrelations, constraints, and 
feedback mechanisms bound the empire together through ‘neutral forces’, such as technology and 
communication, but also due to a functional imperative, e.g. an idea or an ideology. This is linked with 
normative universalism, which are basic rights that are considered collective goods, like civil, political 
and social rights. 77 These are not just enjoyed by one imperial nation, but by all.  
Lastly, the external factor of global challenges or threats, was a strong incentive for the 
empire’s nations to bond together. The fact that all are affected by the same challenges and threats 
enhances the will to cooperate under some kind of central authority a necessity.78 The peoples Austria-
Hungary had an interest in the external safety, internal wealth, and influence which they enjoyed while 
staying together as His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty’s subjects, but not as individual states.79 
This element provides, according to Cerutti, the unquestionable force for people to act in accordance 
with one another.  
These three elements were institutionalised within Austria-Hungary’s Übernational, or 
supranational, common institutions..80 The imperial bureaucracy and the Gemeinsame Armee were not 
only symbols of unity, but also powerful forces that kept the empire together. As Crone states, the 
bureaucracy did not serve the state, It was the state. In Cisleithania, German was, for a long time, the 
lingua franca, and while other nationalities were not blocked from entering the bureaucracy, the 
Austro-German upper classes and assimilated aristocracies dominated the higher echelons.81  
 The Kaiserlich und königliche Gemeinsame Armee was likewise an imperial institution which, 
as its name suggests, operated in both halves of the Dual Monarchy. It bore no responsibility to either 
parliament or government, but solely to the emperor-king as Oberste Kriegsherr. While many 
nationalists perceived the army to be partial (it was used against them in 1848, it was dominated by 
an Austro-German officer corps, and its Kommandosprache was German), it did function as a ‘school 
of the empire’ and as a way to bring people from all over the empire together through the Conscription 
law of 1868. Conscripts and recruits from all over the empire therefore had to learn some German to 
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understand commands and to speak with their superiors. Furthermore, they also came in contact with 
other nationalities, as of the 102 infantry regiments, only 22 were of a nationally homogenous nature.  
During their training they were also instilled with Kaisertreue, imperial values, and their 
responsibility at maintaining the dynasty and their lands.82 It is questionable that this school of the 
empire idea worked for every individual, but it is certainly true that while with the army, the majority 
of people were imbued with a strong patriotic feelings based on a dynastic, patriarchal society, respect 
for the traditional order and traditional dynastic leadership.83 This importance of this dynastic-military 
alliance was noted by archduke Albrecht, who was a cousin of the emperor’s father. As Inspector 
General of the Habsburg forces he stated that in “no country is uniformity and the dynastic soldiery 
spirit as vital […] because only the dynasty and the army hold this divided monarchy together.”84  
 These common interests and institutions found their way in the anational Österreichische 
Staatsidee, the idea of Austrianness, i.e. a Gesamtstaat or Gesamtmonarchie with Gesamtstaats-
bewusstsein. In other words, an empire in which the differences between peoples were recognised, 
but with a form of centralised government and army headed by the common Habsburg sovereign.85 It 
did not politicise language, culture, or ethnicity, but rested on the idea a community of interests 
between dynasty and local elites/aristocracy, which linked them to the imperial state. It was again 
archduke Albrecht who emphasized this by stating that: “in a polyglot Empire inhabited by so many 
races and peoples the dynasty must not allow itself to be assigned exclusively to one of these. Just as 
a good mother, it must show equal love for all its children and remain foreign to none. In this lies the 
justification for its existence.”86 
 Austrianness was an anational idea that allowed the ‘Austrian political nation’ to be united 
around the common popular sovereign and legacy of Habsburg rule, while enjoying the benefits of a 
common defence, imperial support for diversity, participation in imperial state institutions, and the 
growing economy. 87  This anationalism made sure that Austrianness would not be a rival for 
nationalism. Very few therefore felt their imperial loyalty to be superseded by their nationalist 
interests as long as both interests were compatible.88 As Arthur May implied, the imperial centre 
actively promoted this anational interpretation of Kaisertreue and in the late nineteenth century the 
imperial centre could and did inspire loyalty. Leaders of national communities characterised by 
Comisso’s pragmatism and accommodation stance, did incorporate Franz Joseph into their own 
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national stories. 89  Like Prokopovych claimed, they may have had one national identity, but the 
nationalist leaders mastered different roles, different loyalties, “that they played at different 
occasions.”90  
 
2.3 Promoting Kaisertreue 
In a time when national movements came up, this was “accompanied by an expansion in forms of 
monarchical self-representation and dynastic political rituals.”91 The closest thing Austria-Hungary had 
like a common patriotism, was dynastic loyalism, which meant allegiance to the current occupant of 
the Habsburg throne. 92 Kaisertreue was one of the few forces unifying the various territories and lands 
under the Habsburg crown.93 The Habsburgs considered only their dynasty, with its traditions and 
history as something that was common to all their peoples and that could demand loyalty from its 
subjects.94 Therefore, the legacy and heritage of the House of Habsburg and Franz Joseph himself were 
utilised by the Court and the Viennese government.95  
 
2.3.1 Religion 
One way, the dynasty utilised itself was through their Pietas Austracia, the piety of the House of 
Austria.96 As the Habsburgs could not base their dynastic support on the idea of a core ethnicity or 
core land, they had to rely on the legitimacy of their God-given rule over the Christian peoples of 
eastern-central Europe. As a consequence, empire and religion were dependent on each other to a 
much greater extent than other states.97  When Franz Joseph came to power on December 2nd 1848, 
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he therefore styled himself ‘von Gottes Gnaden Kaiser von Oesterreich’.98 While his uncle, emperor 
Ferdinand, had stopped using the ‘by the Grace of God’, Franz Joseph reinstated it to emphasise the 
divine monarchical principle, that power came from God and not the people; and to state that tradition 
was to be a pillar for his reign.99 The Catholic faith had in premodern times been a strong pillar of 
Habsburg rule. Through the counterreformation and the baroque, the Habsburgs had strengthened 
the bonds between dynasty and church and succeeded in converting a large part of the population 
(back) to the Catholic faith. In the Concordat of 1855, the church had gained oversight of primary 
education and it was agreed that marriage would be based on canonical law. Moreover, the bishops 
and cardinals sat in the Herrenhaus, the Cisleithanian House of Lords, and many of the lower clergy 
took seats in the Reichsrat, the house of representatives.100  
 In exchange, the church made sure that the faithful were made aware of the divine blessing of 
Franz Joseph’s reign and the Habsburg dynasty’s piousness. Legends about Rudolf I and the priest 
carrying the Eucharist and the rescue of Maximilian I from the mountains by the angel Gabriel in the 
guise of a peasant, supported the claim that the Habsburgs ruled by the Grace of God.101 Throughout 
the year the emperor performed two rituals to strengthen the claim of catholic kingship, be it the 
annual foot washing on Maundy Thursday or the grand Corpus Christi procession. The latter, held every 
year on the first Thursday following Trinity Sunday, was an important opportunity for the emperor to 
show himself in public and to showcase the relationship between church and dynasty. 102  
The importance of this relationship is illustrated in Joseph Roth’s Radetzkymarsch:  
 
“The monarchy, our monarchy, is based on piety, on the faith that God has chosen the 
Habsburgers to reign over so and so many Christian peoples. Our emperor is a worldly 
brother to the pope, it is his imperial and royal apostolic majesty, none other is like he is: 
apostolic, no other majesty in Europe is so dependent on the Grace of God an on the faith 
of the peoples in the Grace of God. The German emperor rules, even when God abandons 
him, possibly by the Grace of the Nation. The emperor of Austria-Hungary cannot be 
abandoned by God.” 103 
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The problem with this state-religion relationship was however that 1) not all Franz Joseph’s subjects 
were catholic, and 2) anti-clerical liberals, socialists, and some nationalists opposed this close 
relationship between church and state. Moreover, the representation of the sacred ruler and the God-
given right to rule directly competed with the claim of national movements to rule their nations. 104 
 
2.3.2 Education 
The Cisleithanian education system did not have the goal to assimilate the youth into an ‘Austrian 
identity’, but it did try to instil them with dynastic loyalty. Primary education was exclusively in the 
local (officially recognised) language, though schools with both German and the local language 
continued to exist until the late 19th century. History was taught through myths and legends and was 
meant to connect the student of the crownland to the dynasty and the monarchy as a whole. Because 
the Habsburgs did no longer emphasized their German origins by the second half of the 19th century, 
the supranational character of the ruling house was emphasized by teaching the local national culture 
when it did not counter Habsburg myths.105  
In secondary schools the Habsburg state itself was emphasized and the curriculum on history 
focused on moments “that were important for the gradual development of the Austrian state idea.”106 
In schoolbooks, the term Vaterland was used to refer to the entire monarchy, Transleithania included. 
Cole argues that the effect of this policy is hard to determine. On the one hand, gymnasia and 
universities were breeding stocks for nationalists, despite teaching Habsburg patriotism. On the other 
hand, a large part of the intelligentsia did participate within the imperial institutions, or were loyal 
subjects to the crown. Schools were therefore special agents for the propagation of dynastic loyalty, 
as stated in a teachers’ manual:  
 
“A rapturous feeling of love and esteem attaches primarily to the leader of the state, 
whose picture is already known to the child from his earliest infancy by the money in 
circulation and by its presence in a dignified place both in the home and the school. He 
should learn to venerate him as the father of the fatherland and extend this reverence to 
all the members of the majestic family.”107  
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Furthermore, schools should not pay attention to national sensitivities and the influence of political 
and national partisanship should by all means be excluded from what was taught. This, however, 
meant relying on the ‘anationality’ of the teachers and many of them actually propagated nationalist 
ideas.108 So schools might not have been able to create the homo austriacus after all. Nevertheless, 
one must keep in mind that people had multiple loyalties and that nationalism did not mean one could 
not be loyal to the monarch. Generations of people were thus instructed by their teachers in Habsburg 
and national mythology. 
 
2.3.3 Personal popularity and Kaiserreisen 
The promotion and success of Kaisertreue was dependent on two elements: the cooperation of 
political elites and the penetration of ideas into broader segments of society by means of the creation 
of a communication network, symbols, institutions, and practises conducive to the formation of a 
group identity (or self-images of such groups).109 Elites could hinder the promotion of Kaisertreue by 
converting imperial symbols into national’ messages or acts of resistance or by claiming the personae 
of the monarch for their ‘own nationality’.110 Imperial representation therefore had to be negotiated, 
but was asymmetric at the same time because it implied acceptance by the local/nationalist elites of 
at least a symbolic, primacy of the imperial centre over all regions of the empire.111 
The personal popularity of Franz Joseph with the elites was an important factor in elite 
willingness to cooperate. The emperor was much less popular in the first two decades of his reign than 
he later became. Martial rule and neo-absolutist centralism alienated many among the local and 
political elites, whether liberals, nationalists, or conservative nobles. The style and content of the 
courts dynastic self-representation and public propaganda was therefore received with a coolness. 
Only after the Ausgleich of 1867 did suspicions diminish. Constitutionalism made the Franz Joseph the 
guarantor of the rule of law, and hence protector of the rights of all peoples of the monarchy. Not just 
the strict father-figure, but the wise and caring patron of all imperial subjects.112  
Furthermore, an assassination attempt in 1853, the imperial wedding of Franz Joseph and 
Elisabeth in 1854, the twenty-fifth accession jubilee in 1873, and the silver wedding anniversary in 
1879 had changed the reputation of the emperor, while the memories of 1848 had faded and imperial 
subjects had been educated for decades in dynastic patriotism by reading poems, stories, and histories 
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of the Habsburgs, praying for Franz Joseph’s health, and participating in annual celebrations reminding 
them that they owed loyalty to the ruler.113 This resulted in great personal popularity of the monarch.  
Aside from banknotes, stamps, coins, and in public offices, the visage of the emperor became 
quite prominent in newspapers, books, pictures, photographs paintings, and other forms of mass 
consumption. Franz Joseph’s reputation as a fair and impartial monarch was often a major feature in 
the media and his qualities, both myth and true, like his strong sense of duty, his personal modesty, 
and his family-mindedness, were emphasized. The omnipresence of the emperor’s face served two 
different but overlapping purposes: representation and propaganda. The emperor was for instance 
often depicted in a private way, i.e. working at his desk or being with his close family, in other words 
“values that counted much with bourgeois society.114 He could also be portrayed as the mighty ruler 
who lived in incredible splendour in Vienna in images which “dazzled the uneducated but imaginative 
peasantry.”115  
 Moreover, Franz Joseph was very recognisable with his sideburns and moustache and 
especially when he got older, the portraits showed an elderly monarch with a  “friendly face … familiar 
and well-known, snow-white bearded under the general’s hat, the clear blue eyes and the benevolent 
face, its features glowing with a mellowed, distinguished calm and mild understanding.”116 This lead to 
the myth of the hard-working good old emperor.117 
 The most important method however remained personal visibility. Franz Joseph had visited all 
the Crownlands during his reign, some quite frequently. During these carefully planned visits he 
inspected military institutions, participated in manoeuvres, opened exhibitions, bridges, hospitals, 
hold receptions for local dignitaries, visited the Landtage, the regional diets, and held speeches. These 
Kaiserreisen were used to further the imperial myth and to create and sustain patriotic feelings 
amongst the populations.118 
The locations and occasions for a visit were therefore not simply made at the whim of the ruler, 
but they were discussed with the emperor’s closest advisors and often reflected the political 
necessities of the moment and whether it would result in a surge of Kaisertreue in the province or a 
reduction in national tensions. Hence they were meticulously organised and thoroughly thought out 
beforehand so that the emperor would come in contact only with carefully selected people while giving 
the impression that all could participate in the event. This was because of the risk of events that might 
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disturb the occasion, such as animosities between nationalities, or possible open expressions of 
disloyalty. Nevertheless, probably only a small minority ever saw the emperor in person. 
Though, by 1880, the Cisleithanian government no longer strictly censored the press, it 
continued to wield significant influence on the coverage of imperial events and matters concerning 
the imperial family.119 “The risk of confiscation to any publication showing Franz Joseph in a bad light 
was very high.” 120  Newspapers were therefore quite positive about imperial events and the 
government tried to persuade the press to give the widest possible publicity to these occasions, which 
was made easier because of the growing frequency of publications, the number of newspapers, and 
literacy rates.121 Newspaper issues still had to be presented to the censor before publication, but short 
of publishing insults to and attacks on the imperial family, ethnic slurs, and open calls for violence, the 
press was free to present widely varying accounts of events to the reading public.122 
Galicia was one of the lesser visited Crownlands. Prior to the Kaiserreise of 1880, Franz Joseph 
had visited Galicia only twice, a Kaiserreise in 1851 and imperial manoeuvres in 1855, during the neo-
absolutist regime. The imperial visit was planned just a few years after the revolutions of 1848 so the 
young emperor could present himself to the population of Galicia during an official inspection tour. 
The Galician administration had to execute the orders of the Habsburg court and Viennese 
government, which had arranged a spectacular display of imperial pomp, ceremony, and dynastic 
power in order to show off the success of the neo-absolutist centralised regime. Franz Joseph reviewed 
military parades, visited fortifications, and rode through Galician cities and towns in colourful 
processions. It was written that the masses hailed their ‘emperor-liberator’ who had ended serfdom.123 
 There was no significant role for the Polish nobility during this tour. They were only to 
participate in the emperor’s entourage. Their political role was limited during the neo-absolutist era 
and their appeals for more autonomy were ignored. Unowsky quotes an west Galician aristocrat who 
stated the hostility of the nobility towards the new regime. 124  The visit was therefore a strictly 
choreographed military and bureaucratic affair.125 
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3. Conservative rule, Polish loyalty, and Szlachta dominance 
 
3.1 The Ausgleich and Cisleithania 
3.1.1 The Habsburg Monarchy 
The Habsburg empire grew by incorporating various crown lands through key marriage alliances. 
Making deals with each set of regional elites separately, the Habsburgs provided concessions and 
granted privileges in return for allegiance.126 Habsburg monarchs relied heavily on the local aristocracy 
to ensure the collection of taxes, control of the peasantry, the administration of justice, and to 
maintain traditional order. In return, the crown contributed to the maintenance of seigniorial wealth, 
inheritance, power, and prestige, maintaining serfdom, and stifling urban and bourgeois development 
in favour of the nobility.127 This feudal compact between the monarchy and the regional landed elite 
secured resources and was beneficial to maintaining stability. 
 Charles Tilly also notes the importance of imperial-elite relationships. In his definition of 
empire, he states that there is: 
 
“1) retention or establishment of particular, distinct compacts for the government of each 
segment; [and] 2) exercise of power through intermediaries who enjoy considerable 
autonomy within their own domains in return for the delivery of compliance, tribute, and 
military collaboration with the center.”128 
 
Nevertheless, the Habsburgs often touched upon this relationship by striving towards a more coherent 
and integrated state structure. The two most notable were Joseph II, whose decade of reforms (1780-
1790) politicised regional elites and affected state-elite relationships, and Franz Joseph’s neo-
absolutist regime, which alienated the liberals and the Hungarian elites. After the defeat of the 
Hungarian revolt of 1848-49 and the subsequent military occupation of Hungary a, the emperor tried 
to incorporate Hungary into an imperial centralised framework which would be governed in a neo-
absolutist fashion from Vienna. 
 Problematic for Franz Joseph’s neo-absolutist regime, was that the Hungarians (and other 
regional elites) opposed and boycotted the centralised state. The Magyar nobles claimed their rights 
based on the Golden Bull of 1222, which placed constitutional limits on the powers of the monarch by 
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establishing the Hungarian Diet, and the rights of the aristocracy to disobey the king when he acted 
against the law.129 The opposition by the Hungarian elites meant that the army had to continue to 
occupy large parts of the empire and could therefore not be used in wars. Moreover, Hungarian units 
deserted, and the finances of the regime worsened drastically. This resulted in an Austrian defeat in 
the Italian war of 1859 and the loss of Lombardy.130 
 Another force, that opposed neo-absolutism, was liberalism. The liberals, mostly Austro-
Germans, did support the centralised state, but not its absolutists character. Like other liberal 
movements in nineteenth-century Europe, they were against clericalism, militarism, absolutism, high 
taxes, and big government. They mostly came from the bureaucracy and bourgeois entrepreneurs, 
who were essential for the imperial government to function and to finance its policies.131 
 With such strong liberal and noble opposition, Franz Joseph was not able to continue his neo-
absolutist regime. In order to keep his administration centralised and to finance his government, he 
made concessions to both which to some extent resulted in restoring Tilly’s two basics of imperial-elite 
relationships. The Reichsrat was recalled, its number of deputies was enlarged, and it was granted 
parliamentary oversight on state expenditures. The emperor had these reforms codified by his 
Minister of the Interior, the Polish Conservative Count Agenor Goluchowski, who made sure that the 
Landtage, which were dominated by the conservative aristocracy, retained the right to vote for the 
Reichsrat deputies. The result was that this October Diploma of 1860 was opposed by the liberals as a 
feudal, anti-liberal, and decentralising document. The Hungarian elites also contested the October 
Diploma in that they refused to acknowledge the authority and legitimacy of a central parliament and 
continued to boycott the imperial institutions.132 
 Franz Joseph therefore compromised with the liberals, in order to get his financial problems 
solved. The resulting February Patent of 1861 was formulated by the liberal Anton von Schmerling. It 
took the new powers away from the Landtage and recentralised the empire. Furthermore, the 
Reichsrat was turned into a bicameral system with a new voting mechanism as to ensure more power 
for the bourgeoisie and gained more power over legislation and the budget.133  
 The Hungarians naturally also opposed the February Patent, as they refused to acknowledge a 
central parliament which could decide over Hungarian matters. The conservative aristocracy remained 
against centralisation, was anti-liberal, and was in favour of returning to the status quo ante 1848. 
Hungarian liberals swayed between wishing independence and a constitutional monarchy in a personal 
union with Austria. In between these factions was the moderate party headed by Ferenc Deák. They 
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argued that Hungary should be a sovereign state, but they recognised the agreed shared prerogatives 
of the monarch as detailed in the Pragmatic Sanction of 1723 (which prescribed the indivisibility of the 
Habsburg possessions), such as defence.134 
 The Reichsrat was further undermined in 1863, when the Polish deputies also boycotted the 
Reichsrat as they were opposed to the declaration of a State of Emergency in Galicia because of the 
February Uprising of 1863-64 in neighbouring Russian Poland.135 The Reichsrat also lost the confidence 
of the monarch as they voted against increased military spending. The liberals argued that they had 
no power over the armed forces and they remembered that the military, as a Kaisertreu institution, 
helped the monarch to quell the liberal movements of 1848. Franz Joseph now had to choose between 
liberal centralisation, but with a lack of finance, or Hungarian support, but with a resulting divided 
empire. He chose the latter and fired von Schmerling, dissolved the Reichsrat, suspended the February 
Patent, and started to negotiate with Deák.136 The defeat in the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 increased 
the pressure for a quick solution. 
  The Ausgleich of 1867 was based on the Pragmatic Sanction and transformed the empire into 
a dualist system of two halves: Cisleithania, officially Die im Reichsrat vertretenen Königreiche und 
Länder, with the adjective k.k., and the Transleithania, officially the Lands of the Crown of Saint 
Stephen, with the adjective k.u.. Institutions common to both halves of the Dual Monarchy would be 
referred to as kaiserlich und königlich, and were limited to the Gemeinsame Armee, the Ministerium 
des kaiserlichen und königlichen Hauses und des Äußern, the Reichskriegsministerium, the 
Reichsfinanzministerium, and the administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
 The constitution of December 21st 1867, known as the Dezemberverfassung, amended the 
February Patent. As the Hungarians refused to recognise a central parliament, the Reichsrat was 
transformed into the parliament of Cisleithania, with a lower house, the Haus der Abgeordneten, and 
an upper house, the Herrenhaus. The lower house consisted of 203 seats and the election of 
representatives remained in the hands of the Landtage with each Crownland having a fixed number of 
allocated seats: 54 for Bohemia, 38 for Galicia, 5 for Dalmatia, 2 for Trieste etc.137 In 1873, the amount 
of seats was increased to 353 and the allocation of seats was changed accordingly, with Galicia now 
having 63.138 The voting system was also changed. Representatives were now chosen by four groups: 
the great landowners (85 seats), urban centres (118 seats), chambers of commerce (21 seats), and 
rural areas (129 seats). The franchise in the urban centres and rural areas was limited to those who 
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paid at least 10 gulden in taxes, which was subsequently lowered to 5 In 1882.139 The Herrenhaus, on 
the other hand, remained a centralised institute with a combination of automatic membership for 
archdukes from the ruling dynasty, the high aristocracy, and high ranking members of the church, and 
those who were appointed a member for life by the emperor.140 
 The new constitution also created a more decentralised state with more power for the 
Landtage. While article 11 prescribed over which topics the Haus der Abgeordneten held authority and 
could adopt legislation, article 12 stated that any topic not mentioned in the constitution, would be 
subject to the authority of the Landtage. If the government wanted to change any of these topics, they 
had to come to an accord with the regional diets.141 Linked to these new rights for the different lands, 
were the new rights of citizenship for all inhabitants of Cisleithania, accompanied with a guarantee of 
equality before the law, freedom of religion, and the equality of all nationalities and their languages.142 
 Finally, the constitution also made provision for the possibility that the Reichsrat could not 
come to an agreement or was unable to meet, so that the government could govern by imperial degree 
as long as it did not relate to constitutional changes.143 According to Crone, this was a power Franz 
Joseph did not possess as king of Hungary, and he would use it several times during his reign.144  
 
3.1.3 The Iron Ring and its successor 
While some assessments of late nineteenth-century Cisleithanian political life described it as “a 
situation of terminal crisis”, more recent studies are less “condemnatory.”145 Scholars still accept that 
there were national difficulties, but also have a more complex and nuanced understanding of the 
constitutional frameworks, the rise of political parties and civil society, and social and economic 
developments. This was the era of Eduard Graf von Taaffe, who was minister-president between 1879-
1893. An era, American historian Gary Cohen, considered to be characterised by “neither absolutism 
nor anarchy.”146  
After the Ausgleich, the Austro-Germans in the Reichsrat were divided between two main 
camps: the liberals and the conservatives/clericals. The liberals favoured centralisation and German 
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dominance and were against raising taxes to spend on the military, while the clericals had more 
federalist tendencies, favouring devolving power to the Landtage.147 This division within the Austro-
German ranks made the Cisleithanian government dependent on minority deputies to support their 
policies. Since the 54 Czech deputies initially boycotted the Reichsrat sessions because they insisted 
they would get the same status as the Hungarians, the liberals gained al majority in the Reichsrat 
between 1867 and 1879.148  
However, the liberals in the Haus der Abgeordneten continued to challenge the emperor on 
his foreign policy dominance and in January 1879 112 liberals voted defiantly against (their own) prince 
Adolph von Auersperg’s liberal government intent to ratify of the Berlin treaty which would legalise 
the military occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. With this vote they damaged their prestige with the 
emperor enormously and by contrast, the conservatives looked increasingly responsible, 
constitutionalist, and Kaisertreu.149 This made the emperor abandon Auersperg and led him to appoint 
Taaffe in February 1879 as new Minister of the Interior in a transition government of Karl Ritter von 
Stremayr to organise elections.150 The 1879 elections cost the liberals 49 seats and their majority. 
Taaffe, as a non-aligned politician, got the assignment to create a new cabinet which loyalty was to be 
“above the parties”.151 Nevertheless he had much difficulty in forming a majority government. As the 
Austro-German vote was split and since a short coalition with the liberals did not work out, he had to 
work with minority deputies.  
First, Taaffe managed to end the Czech boycott by making German and Czech equal 
Landessprache in external administration in Bohemia and Moravia in 1880. 152  Then he formed a 
coalition with them (54 seats), the tight-knit Polenklub or the Kolo Polskie (57 seats) and a combination 
of German clericals, Slovenes, Croats, and Rumanians (57 seats). However, since this coalition had only 
168 of the 353 seats in the Reichsrat, with 174 representatives in opposition, Taaffe had to turn to the 
11 independents for each vote.153  
This reliance by the government on Crownland delegations and Taaffe’s policy of granting 
some autonomy to “historic-political entities”, made participation in the Reichsrat more attractive to 
the provincial and nationalist elites.154 Not only did their support ensure an increase in their Kaisertreu 
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and imperial reputation, but it also increased their chances of lobbying for a decentralisation of 
power.155 Especially since they got important ministerial positions: the Polish conservative Julian Ritter 
von Dunajewski became Minister of Finance in June 1880, and Florian Ritter von Ziemialkowski, a 
member of the Polish liberals, remained Minster for Galicia, which he had been since 1873. 156 
Nevertheless, Taaffe never had to dance to the wishes of the Poles and Czechs as he could threaten to 
give in to the liberals instead.157 For thirteen years, Taaffe’s ‘Iron Ring’ government thus managed to 
govern, create some political stability, and ensure financial resources to buttress Austria-Hungary’s 
diplomatic position.158  
In October 1893, after fourteen years the Iron Ring fell. The Czech deputies had been replaced 
with younger, more nationalist ones, and they took on a more opposition-like role. This forced Taaffe 
to turn more often to the Austro-German liberals for support. Subsequently, liberal ‘antislavism’ 
caused the Czechs to completely leave the coalition. Also the Poles were unhappy, as a planned reform 
of the franchise would jeopardise their dominant position in Galicia.159 Taaffe’s dismissal of Dunajewski 
in 1891, who opposed cooperation with the liberal opposition, did not help.160 The liberals, clericals, 
the conservatives, and the Polish Club demanded the end of the Taaffe administration, but decided to 
continue cooperating in a Grand Coalition under Alfred Graf zu Windisch-Grätz, who became minister-
president on November 11th 1893.161 The importance of Polish support was reflected in that they got 
two ministers: Stanislaw Ritter von Madeyski on Education and Apollinar Ritter von Jaworsky as 
minister for Galicia.162 
  
3.2 Galicia 
3.2.1 The Poles 
The Königreich Galizien und Lodomerien, as the Crownland was officially called, occupied a region that 
is currently divided between Poland and Ukraine. The conglomerate territory of Polish west Galicia and 
Ruthenian east Galicia was acquired by the Habsburg Monarchy in the first partition of Poland in 1772 
and the subsequent 1793 and 1795 partitions. The name of this new Crownland was given to legitimise 
Habsburg rule by basing it on a medieval Hungarian claim to Ruthenian Galicia.  
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 The Crownland was ruled centrally from Vienna, but after the Ausgleich autonomy was 
granted. Although, technically the October Diploma already allowed for Galician autonomy by 
changing the empire’s organisation from neo-absolutist centralism to aristocratic federalism and 
increasing the power of local elites.163 The Polish elites expressed their delight in the imperial pledge 
for Galician autonomy in exchange for Polish loyalty and in their 1866 address to Franz Joseph they 
said: “With you, Our most Gracious Monarch, we stay and wish to stay.”164 However, the October 
Diploma and the subsequent February Patent failed due to political opposition and it was only after 
the Ausgleich of 1867 that the Crownland gained autonomy.165 This post Ausgleich period is often 
referred to as the Galician Autonomy era (1867-1918).  
 The Autonomy era was mainly achieved through the work of Goluchowski, who was also thrice 
Statthalter, governor, of Galicia (1849-1859, 1866-1868, and 1871-1875), and a group of conservative 
west-Galician Szlachta or Slachzizen, Polish nobles, who dubbed themselves the Stanczycy or 
Stanczyks, after a famous Polish court jester who was a symbol of Polish patriotism.166 The Poles 
actively supported the 1863 January Uprising in Russian (Congress) Poland and the Austrian 
government had declared a state of siege in the Crownland. The subsequent defeat of the uprising by 
Russian forces and the distrust of the Austrian government of Polish sedition convinced them and a 
new generation of Szlachta to reject revolution as a political tool and instead turned towards a 
pragmatic/accommodative program of imperial loyalism and focusing on the encouragement of Polish 
culture and economic growth. 167  
In 1867, Jósef Szujski, Stanislaw Tarnowski, Stanislaw Kozmian, and Ludwik Wodzicki published 
the Teka Stanczyka, the Stanczyk Portfolio, in the Przeglad Polski newspaper. This portfolio, which 
turned the Stanczyks effectively in a political faction and argued against glorifying revolution and the 
encouragement of demonstrations against the Ausgleich. The Stanczyks argued that reform would help 
Polish interests. Any call for protest or revolution was only a diversion of the population from realistic 
goals such as strengthening the Poles’ cultural and economic status, i.e. so-called ‘organic work’.168 In 
the words of Aleksander Świętochowski, a writer from Russian Poland, “What does every one of us, 
taken individually, demand? Is it soldiers, battles, victories, conquests, parliaments, representatives, 
in a word a political apparatus? No, everyone dreams only of being able to live happily, in conformity 
with the laws of his personal and collective nature.”169  
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The Stanczyks considered it possible to achieve this without necessarily establishing a Polish 
sovereign state.170 Goluchowski and the Stanczyks’ idea was to reduce (or even take away) the distrust 
of the Poles from the mind of the Austrian government through a policy of accommodation with the 
imperial state which would secure a leading and dominant position for the Polish elites in Galicia and 
secure nationalist policies. Therefore, Goluchowski and the Stanczyks set to build a conservative 
coalition comprised of the Stanczyk Szlachta, Cracow and Lemberg bureaucrats, and the Podolacy 
(East-Galician magnates). Based on the agreement of Kaisertreue and Polish nationalist gains, this 
coalition had by 1880 managed to solidify their control of political and cultural institutions of Galicia.171 
Moreover, Stanczyk members gained significant influence in Galicia, for instance over leading west-
Galician newspapers such as CZAS (Time) and Przeglad Polski, or through important posts like Józef 
Szujski, who was rector of Cracow’s Jagiellonian University, Józef Majer, who became president of the 
Academy of Sciences, and count Alfred Potocki, who had been the prime minister of Cisleithania 
between 1870-1871 and became the Statthalter of Galicia between 1875-1883.172 
 Furthermore, due to the restrictive voting franchise and election manipulation, Polish and 
Ruthenian peasant representation in the Galician Landtag, the Sejm, was minimalised, thereby 
ensuring conservative control of the Galician parliament. This combination of parliamentary majority 
and having officials in high executive offices, “accelerated the Polonization of the administrative” that 
had begun under Goluchowski (Polish had been made the internal administrative language in the 
Galician judiciary and administration in the early 1870’s).173 In 1877 the Sejm therefore established the 
Wydzial Krajowy, a committee of six parliamentarians that oversaw an apparatus of administration 
parallel to the Statthalterei.174  
The conservative coalition, however, also faced opposition from other Poles. Like in 
Cisleithania, the Galician political landscape was divided between conservatism and liberalism. The 
main opposition against Stanczyk policies therefore came from the liberal Towarzystwo Narodowo-
Demokratyczne, the Polish Democratic Party, under the leadership of Franciszek Smolka175 The liberals 
emphasised the history and traditions of the Polish nation, anticlericalism and democracy, which stood 
for community, collective values, the end of aristocratic rule, and the end of the Austrian enforced 
institutional structure, that would benefit the nations development.176 In other words, the liberal 
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programme was one of democratic national patriotism, and much less pragmatic/accommodative than 
that of the conservative Stanczyks.177  
Lemberg, which was a stronghold of the Polish Democratic Party, while Cracow was that of the 
Stanczyks. During the autonomy era, Lemberg, the capital of the Galician Crownland and home to the 
Galician parliament, the Sejm, transformed from a city of German-speaking bureaucrats to a Polish 
speaking city. However, Lemberg was also home to large groups of Jews, Ruthenes, and German-
speakers. According to Markian Prokopovych, this resulted in the Galician capital becoming an arena 
for contests of representation, especially between the Poles and Ruthenes.178 Nevertheless, despite 
the nationalist conflicts, the city remained “one of the most Kaisertreu in the monarchy.”179 
The Poles’ strongest trump card was the Polish Club in the Reichsrat, in which the Polish 
conservatives and liberals were united under the strong leadership of Kazimierz Ritter von 
Grocholski.180 They managed to overcome their different perspectives on opposition against Viennese 
control and imperial loyalty for the common Polish interest of Galicia. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, 
both the conservative coalition and the Polish Democrats agreed to work together in the Reichsrat and 
to support the Taaffe administration in exchange for incremental gains for Polish interests in Galicia 
and important government positions. As Alan Sked states “the year 1868 therefore brought an effusive 
declaration of loyalty to the Monarchy and to dualism, with which the Poles proved themselves the 
staunchest pillar of the new political system.”181  
Stanczyk hegemony, and their political vision, came under attack however in the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century. New generations and upcoming urban elites increasingly perceived the 
Democrats as the party of the future. The liberals emphasized industrialising Galicia, a message that 
was favoured by the middle classes, and opposition against aristocratic rule, while the conservative 
coalition continued to serve aristocratic interests by favouring agrarian policies.182 They even founded 
a new newspaper, Nowa Reforma, in Stanczyk dominated Cracow, to express the re-energised liberal 
vision. The elections for the Sejm of 1889 therefore resulted in a larger liberal representation. There 
was now a more clear division than ever before between the conservative coalition between Stanczyks 
and the aristocracy, the Unia koserwatywna, and the democratic left, the Lewica.183 The conservatives 
were slowly losing their dominant position within Galicia.  
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3.2.2 The Ruthenes 
While the western part of Galicia was home to the majority of Poles, while the Ruthenes dwelled 
mostly in the east. Before 1848, the Ruthenes had been divided into the Greek Catholic clergy and the 
peasantry, with very few intellectuals living in the cities.184 Its nobility had by then largely assimilated 
into the Szlachta and urban dwellers were mostly Poles. In the nineteenth century, however, the 
Ruthenes started to focus more on their national-cultural identity within Polish Galicia and its links 
with their Ukrainian brethren in Russia. In 1848 their leaders declared clearly that “Wir sind anders” 
and “Wir sind nicht Polen”, but “galizische Ruthenen”, a people with its own language, religion and 
history.185 
These leaders, the starorusyny (Old Ruthenes), also known as St. George’s Circle, dominated 
Ruthenian intellectual life before the 1860’s. Made up mostly by Greek Catholic clerics, they had a 
“vague sense of cultural unity with other Rus’ people”, but they remained loyal to the imperial state.186 
As the first leaders of the ‘Ruthenian nation’, they dominated Ruthenian cultural institutions, like the 
National Home and their newspaper Slovo (The Word).187  
Within this group there were those whose convictions gradually changed and became 
increasingly more pro-Russian, after what they considered to be the ‘Austrian betrayal of Ruthenian 
Kaisertreue by letting the ‘seditious’ Polish nobility rule them after 1848.188 Moreover, initiatives by 
Statthalter Goluchowski to Latinise the Ruthene Cyrillic alphabet religious reforms to make the Greek 
Catholics less orthodox further aggravated them and some of them started to call themselves Moloda 
Rus, the Young Russians, but they were also known as the Young Ruthenes.189 These ‘Russophiles’ 
desired a strengthening of Ukrainian national identity, autonomy for the Ruthenes, or a cultural and 
political unification with Ukraine, in some cases even with Russia.190  
Besides the Old Ruthenes and the Young Russians, another group developed, the 
‘Ukrainophiles’, also known as the national populists. They were unsatisfied with the status quo and 
wanted to cultivate Ukrainian culture and language within the imperial framework. They also founded 
their own newspaper in 1880, Dilo (The Deed) in opposition to the Old Ruthene/Russophile one191 and 
held their first public manifestation in Lemberg in 1880.192 
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The Ruthenes were represented by Old Ruthenes in the Reichsrat and had been allies of the 
liberal government of Auersperg despite liberal anticlericalism and the fact that two-thirds of the 
Ruthenian deputation were clerics. 193  The Ruthenes did support the liberals because of the 
enlightened heritage of Joseph II who’s reforms had targeted inequality between peoples and 
religions. The Auersperg administration did however rest on a solid parliamentary majority and the 
vision of a centralised Cisleithania. The Ruthene representatives could therefore not utilise their 
support as successfully as the Poles later did with Taaffe.194 After the 1879 elections, the Ruthenes lost 
many seats and ended with only three representatives. The liberal opposition therefore did no longer 
consider them to be useful allies and the Ruthenes, though often still voting with the liberals, also 
posed themselves as a government-friendly opposition. They also cooperated somewhat with the 
Polish representative, but after the death of Grocholski in 1888, the four remaining Ruthenian 
representatives left the Polish Club and joined the opposition against Taaffe and later Windisch-
Grätz.195 
Within the Galician diet, the Poles were dominant and only 8,6-14,2% of the seats in the Sejm 
were occupied by Ruthenes between 1877-1908.196 They could therefore not form an effective political 
opposition within the Crownland and soon the official language in the province and the two 
universities (Cracow and Lvov) was Polish and only Polish schools and cultural institutions received 
official support while Ruthenian ones did not. Needless to say, this fed the sense of grievance of the 
Ruthenes and led to nationalist tensions. Nevertheless, compared to the views of the Polish Democrats 
on Polishness, the Ruthenes considered the “Krakauer”, the Stanczyks, as more open and tolerant than 
the “Lemberger.”197 
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4. Nationalist Kaisertreue in Galicia 1880 
 
4.1 The different ambitions of 1880 
It was not until 1880, twenty-five years after the last visit, that the emperor returned to Galicia. The 
Kaiserreise of 1851 had been a spectacular display of imperial pomp, ceremony, and dynastic power. 
Post-Ausgleich constitutionalism and the Autonomy era in Galicia meant that these celebrations were 
no longer needed to strengthen the militaristic neo-absolutist state. Constitutionalism had changed 
the role, or at least the perception, of Franz Joseph and, as Galicia had become more autonomous, the 
success of promoting Kaisertreue now more than ever rested on the cooperation of political elites and 
their help in penetrating this idea into the broader segments of society through the media, Habsburg 
symbolism, institutions, and the formation of an imperial group identity.  
 Besides the old characterisation of the emperor as the personification of the state and the 
representative of the history, honour, and prestige of the Monarchy, constitutionalism had made Franz 
Joseph the guarantor of the rule of law and the protector of all peoples of the Dual Monarchy, their 
equality, their language, and their heritage.198 No longer the strict father-figure who ruled over his 
children, now he was the wise and caring patron of the social, economic, and political development of 
all imperial subjects. The programme and the goals of the Kaiserreise adjusted accordingly and less 
attention was given to the military during the visits, though it remained an important aspect of every 
imperial inspection tour, and more to events that would bolster the link between dynasty/imperial 
state and the local elites, and between monarch and his peoples. 
The imperial visit was also an important stage in the conflict between the Austro-German 
liberals and the conservative Iron Ring government of Cisleithania. Taaffe’s administration rested on 
the support of the Polish Club to maintain its majority over the liberal opposition and the Kaiserreise 
therefore had to support their allies, the Polish conservatives. Moreover, it was also to remind the 
Poles of the benefits of belonging to the Dual Monarchy, by promoting dynastic loyalty and to remind 
the Poles that under Habsburg rule they enjoyed a national autonomy experienced by the Poles of no 
other land.  
As Franz Joseph’s popularity had risen enormously since 1851, the Polish elites, both pro-
autonomy aristocrats, anti-absolutist liberals, and critical nationalists, were much more willing to 
cooperate with the Court to spread Kaisertreue and to use it for their own benefit. They utilised the 
popular Franz Joseph in order to influence public opinion into supporting their vision for Galicia and 
the Polish nation.199 Unlike 1851, when the Galician administration had to bow to the wishes of Vienna, 
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the Polish conservatives now took the initiative in organising the celebrations. The Cisleithanian 
government and the court therefore generally deferred to the Crownland’s administration on the 
content of speeches and planned ceremonial occasions.  
Nevertheless, Franz Joseph retained the right to approve every detail and change in the 
programme, and he did so, even last-minute.200 Moreover, Statthalter Potocki often corresponded 
with the Court official in charge of the Kaiserreise, the emperor’s General adjutant, field Marshall 
Friedrich Freiherr von Mondel, as to coordinate the events and to make sure both sides agreed with 
the programme, the travel schedule, and which cities the emperor should visit.201 Furthermore, the 
Hofquartiermeister, Michael von Branko, travelled to Cracow and Lemberg to arrange all local imperial 
receptions and banquets, as well as lodgings for the emperor and his staff.202 Together, the Court and 
the Polish conservatives agreed on a programme that would promote Kaisertreue based “on the 
mutual understanding of rights and duties between the emperor, as the symbol of the state, and the 
Polish conservatives, as the acknowledged legitimate and natural leadership of Galicia.” 203  The 
Stanczyk vision of a Polish Galicia under Habsburg rule would be presented to the masses and the 
reading public of Austria-Hungary. 
The conservative coalition in the Sejm voted to allocate funds for an elaborate reception and 
a central committee was established under the direction of Ludwik Wodzicki, original Stanczyk 
member and now the Landmarschall.204 One of the main decisions taken by this committee was the 
establishment of a citizens guard wearing national red-white or blue-white colours, to provide security 
during the emperor’s stay in Cracow and to show the Kaisertreue of the population and its support for 
the monarchy.205 Normally, army units in the Crownland would be mobilised for the emperor’s visit. 
Article 47 of the Dienst-Reglement für das kaiserlich-königliche Heer prescribed that during a 
Kaiserreise, the emperor should be guarded by the military, that there should be military honour 
guards, and that military parades were to be held.206 Potocki pleaded with Von Mondel to leave the 
security arrangements to the citizens guard in order to prevent Galician discontent in seeing the army 
on the streets as this would be reminiscent of military occupation. Having the emperor surrounded by 
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the citizen’s guard would show his trust in his Galician subjects. Therefore, an exception was made 
through a special Command nr. 180.207 
The committee also used the Kaiserreise to define a series of Polish national symbols, all of 
which had been gained and supported due to the close relationship between the emperor and the 
Polish elites. Franz Joseph approved the preliminary program which was to emphasize the advantages 
of this close relationship. 208  Visits would include the Galician Diet, the Krakow and Lemberg 
Universities, and the Krakow Academy of Sciences, all of which were dominated by Stanczyk’s or other 
members of the conservative coalition.  
The Polish liberal opposition opposed the narrative of natural Szlachta leadership and absolute 
loyalty to the Habsburgs and while the conservative coalition dominated Cracow and the Sejm, 
Lemberg remained a bastion of the Polish liberals. Events in Lemberg therefore did not always confirm 
to the will of the Polish conservatives.209 The Polish Democrats organised festivities with a Polish 
national message which was not limited to Galicia, for instance inviting Polish dancers from Russian 
Poland for a theatre production.210  
The Kaiserreise was also an opportunity for the Ruthenian elites to portray depict themselves 
as the other nationality in Galicia that was different from the Poles and their vision of a Polish Galicia. 
The refusal of the Lemberg Ruthenes to accept the low profile assigned to them in the conservative-
produced presentation of Galician society placed some limits on the all-Polish flavour of the inspection 
tour in east Galicia.211 The Russophile Ukrainophile division within Ruthene society manifested itself in 
the different reactions of Slovo and Dilo to the Polish dominance. Ruthenian intellectuals of both sides 
criticised Polish domination of the preparations for the Kaiserreise. Slovo suggested that the Poles had 
“forgotten” to look for Ruthenes, outside of the Greek Catholic clergy, and had “forgotten” about the 
existence of the Ruthenes. 212  Bishop Sembratovyc, leader of the Old Ruthenes, wrote to Potocki 
insisting on the addition of imperial visits to the Ruthenian National Home and to St. George’s Greek 
Catholic Cathedral. Dilo newspaper argued in the meantime that Ruthenes had the right and obligation 
to greet the emperor, since “[w]e still live in Austria and not in Poland.”213  
 In reaction, the Russophiles wanted to create a list of grievances and present it to the emperor 
during the Kaiserreise, while the Ukrainophiles wanted to make the events a success in order to prove 
to the Poles, the emperor, and the rest of the Dual Monarchy, “that the Ruthenians existed, were loyal 
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to Austria and to the Habsburgs […], and would not allow themselves to be represented and governed 
by Poles.”214 In a meeting in the Ruska Rada, the Ruthenian Council, the National Populists managed 
to win the discussion in favour of organising Ruthenian events, but they promised a large protest 
gathering in Lemberg against the Poles after the emperor had left.215 The Polish conservatives had to 
acquiesce to this as Franz Joseph’s desire to show himself as the father and caring patron of all of his 
peoples led him to ask to visit institutions, churches, and temples from the other nationalities.216 
 
4.2 Cracow and Lemberg 
The programme of the Kaiserreise was revisited several times to include new visits to institutions, 
receptions, or to change the amount of time reserved for those visits. Nevertheless, the travel schedule 
for the Kaiserreise remained mostly untouched. On September 1st, Franz Joseph would arrive in Cracow 
and would be received by those with high courtly titles, the clergy, the officer corps, and 
representatives of the authorities. After three days of audiences, receptions, dinners, balls, and visits, 
he would travel on for military manoeuvres and after that arrive in Lemberg on September 11th where 
he would stay for four days.217 
In Cracow, festivities followed the schedule authored by Potocki and the Polish conservative 
dominated central committee. According to the liberal Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung the imperial visit 
was first and foremost a display of the ‘Polishness’ of Galicia’s main institutions.218 The emperor knelt 
before relics of Polish saints held aloft by Roman Catholic priests and signed his name in Polish in school 
guest books. When Franz Joseph arrived, some 50,000 lined the streets of Cracow, the largest city in 
western Galicia, the political stronghold of the Stanczyks, and, with its castles, monasteries, and 
churches, the symbolic capital of the defunct Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.219  
The emperor held several speeches, the content of which was coordinated between the 
Kabinettskanzlei and the Stanczyk dominated Statthalterei, and therefore included references to the 
natural and legitimate leadership of the Polish aristocracy and the emperor’s own role as the symbol 
of the state and the guarantor of Polish heritage and culture. In Cracow, for instance, Franz Joseph said 
that “Es freut Mich, bei Meinem Besuch Galiziens zuertst das Gebiet dieser altehrwürdigen Stadt 
betreten zu können, an welche sich so viele geschichtliche Erinnerungen des ganzen Landes 
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knüpfen.“220 Moreover, he praised the Polish aristocracy who, based on their “ritterliche Traditionen”, 
worked for the good of Galicia and the Monarchy. 221  The content was however not completely 
controlled by the Polish conservatives as Franz Joseph and Taaffe had to approve the speeches and 
they could make changes.222 The Kabinettkanzlei, for instance, altered a speech for the city of Lemberg 
by crossing out parts that referred to it as the “Landshaupstadt” or called it the centre of Galician 
development.223 
Speeches by notables and officials were also written by the Galician government, often in 
Polish, and always included the conservative principles of unshakable loyalty to the emperor, dynastic 
patriotism of the people, the relationship between the elite and the monarch, and the development 
of the Poles and their identity under Habsburg rule. Especially the mutually reinforcing nature of these 
aspects was to be emphasized.224 Cracow mayor Zyblikiewicz’s draft on his welcoming speech for 
instance included the lines: “under Your Majesy’s just sceptre, we have been permitted to be and to 
remain Poles.”225 He further praised the emperor who “recognized our national rights, and aided the 
development of national institutions that once again ignite the spirit of our national life.”226 Other 
speeches by politicians, Stanczyks, and other members of the Galician administration, also made these 
principles the core of their message.  
 The Court received these Polish speeches with German translations in order to formulate the 
emperor’s responses. These were mostly done in German (not a language broadly understood by the 
masses) and often of a similar nature, stating his delight in the receptions, the organisation, and the 
cheering people, while he recognised their expressed loyalty to his house and emphasized his hope 
that they would continue to do so in the future as well as cooperate with the rest of the empire. For 
example, in Cracow he responded to the speech by the Landmarschall Wodzicki with: 
 
“Bleiben Sie auch fernerhin fest und standhaft in der Treue und Anhänglichkeit an Mein 
Haus und das Reich, von dessen Blüthe auch Ihre Wohl bedingt ist, - mögen auch all 
diejenigen, die berufen sind, für das Beste der Bevölkerung zu sorgen, im einträchtigen 
Zusammenwirken und uneigennütziger Fürsorge für das Land nicht ermüden, und Sie 
können stets Meiner besonderen Gewogenheit versichert sein.“227 
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The Polish conservative’s vision of representing a Polish Galicia was further emphasized 
through clothing and language during official events. Von Mondel and his official Von Loebenstein, 
who amongst many others accompanied the emperor during his visit, often send back reports to the 
Erster Obersthofmeisteramt, the head of the imperial court, prince Konstantin zu Hohenlohe-
Schillingsfürst, detailing the exact times of arrival and departure of the emperor and noting important 
events. A report by Loebenstein, for instance, describes how the aristocracy and high ranking 
authorities welcomed the emperor in their “Nationalcostuum” at Cracow station. 228  National 
costumes were also worn during banquets and balls229 and the invitations were often written in Polish, 
even those for non-Polish speakers like Von Loebenstein.230 Moreover, not only the elites wore their 
national costumes, the Cracow district also organised and clothed six-hundred peasant riders to 
accompany the emperor’s carriage procession.231 
The most visible and important event that emphasised Polish heritage and culture was the 
dedication of Wawel Castle as an imperial residence. This decision had been prepared for months, with 
the Sejm passing a resolution in July 1880 requesting the removal of the imperial garrison and changing 
its designation as a fortress.232 In a ceremony on September 2nd, Wodzicki, asked the emperor to 
restore the castle to its former glory as a royal residence, which the emperor conceded in a speech.233 
This was an important symbolic gesture in that the former residence of Polish monarchs, symbolising 
Polish heritage and culture, became a Habsburg residence, thereby symbolising the union of Galicia 
and the Polish nation with the Habsburg dynasty and the Austrian monarchy.234 According to CZAS, 
with this act Franz Joseph symbolised that he was no foreign ruler occupying Polish lands, but an heir 
to the kings of Poland and one of their own.235 
The speeches, costumes, and events mattered and influenced public opinion more than in 
1851, as the 1880 Kaiserreise was a public event. Due to new communication technology, publication 
of (critical) newspapers, improvements in the education system, increasing literacy, and expansion of 
suffrage for Reichsrat elections, Galicia’s inhabitants were more aware of the imperial centre and were 
called up to participate in the reception of the emperor. In the reports, Von Loebenstein mentions the 
many Galicians who stood beside the railway tracks to greet the emperor on his way to Cracow and he 
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describes the emperor’s arrival “unter dem Jübel von der bevolkerung.”236  Mondel, furthermore, 
records that the people who “begeizsts jübelen die authentische Freude über der angefangen Besuchs 
Seiner Majestät.“237 The goal that during this visit, nearly every Galician either saw the emperor, spoke 
to someone who did, read about his visit, or heard it from a town-crier or priest, was probably 
achieved.  
 In between his visits to Cracow and Lemberg, Franz Joseph did participate in military 
manoeuvres outside Premissel (Przemyśl) for about seven days.238 The military aspects of the visits and 
their coverage were limited by the conservatives to not detract from the Polish nature of the 
festivities. 239  After Premissel, the emperor visited Lemberg, the official capital of the Galician 
Crownland and its largest city. Approximately one hundred thousand peoples lined the street as the 
emperor arrived, with many having travelled to the Galician capital. Unlike Cracow, which was the city 
of the Stanczyks and Polishness, Lemberg was the ‘Austrian city’ in Galicia with its distinctive buildings 
and a cosmopolitan population of Poles, Ruthenes, Jews, Armenians, and Germans. Furthermore, it 
was in the hands of the Polish Democrats, not the conservatives and it was the centre of Ruthenian 
intellectual life.240 The conservative narrative of a natural Szlachta rule and an all-Polish presentation 
of Galician society was therefore much more contested. Nevertheless, another report by Von 
Loebenstein also noted that the authorities and aristocracy chose to receive Franz Joseph in national 
costume.241 
 The Ruthenes formed the largest challenge for the conservative narrative. As mentioned 
earlier, the Russophiles and Ukrainophiles united behind the plan to host Ruthenian events for the 
emperor while refraining from public demonstrations against Polish oppression during the emperor’s 
visit as a token of their Kaisertreue. They also used national costumes, blue-yellow colours, and 
symbolism to present their nation as different from the Poles.242 The liberal Neue Freie Presse, which 
was pro-Ruthenian, noted the Ruthenian efforts and wrote that “Das ruthenische Volk wird den Kaiser 
von Oesterreich-Ungarn als seinen rechtmäßigen Herrscher ehrfurchtsvoll begrüßen, aber seineswegs 
sich zu einer Folie für die polnische Herrlichkeit und das „Versöhnungsprogramm“ des Grafen Taaffe 
hergeben.”243 
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 The emperor’s visit to St. Georges Cathedral and the National Home were important for the 
Ruthenes to show off their nationhood not only to the emperor, but also to the reading public of the 
Dual Monarchy. On September 13th, a large gathering of Ruthene priests received the emperor and a 
speech by bishop Sembratovyc was held in Ukrainian to emphasise their difference from the Poles and 
their loyalty to the Habsburg monarch. 244 The visit to the National Home was utilised by the Ruthenes 
to declare their nationhood, as one of their leaders praised Franz Joseph for his imperial protection for 
all that was “sacred and precious for the Ruthenians, our nationality, our ecclesiastical rite, our 
language, our script, our customs and our ways […] the more than one thousand year old heritage of 
the Ruthenian nation.”245 
  Another thing the emperor did, that did not please the conservatives, was his acceptance of 
grievances and petitions of the common folk. The conservatives argued that presenting petitions to 
imperial institutions, such as the Court and the Cisleithanian government, undermined their Galician 
institutions and ordered the citizen’s guard to deter the people from trying. However, Franz Joseph 
often halted his walk or his carriage ride in order to receive them and reports mention over 9,000 
petitions that were presented to him during the Kaiserreise.246 Franz Joseph was a wealthy monarch 
and the people knew he often distributed funds to petitioners and charities. Moreover, a court official 
Joseph von Kundrat advised the emperor to be extra liberal with giving money in this case, for “the 
political importance, which lies in the impression left on the population, cannot be overlooked.”247 
 
4.3 Political and national perspectives 
As mentioned earlier, the censorship of the news coverage of the 1880 Kaiserreise was quite limited. 
Taaffe’s government, the Austro-German liberals, Ruthenian intellectuals, The Polish Conservatives 
and the Polish Democrats were therefore free to frame their own interpretation of the imperial visit.248 
To control the coverage to some extent, minister-president Taaffe asked Von Mondel that Dr. Heinrich 
Blumenstok of the pro-government Wiener Zeitung would receive full access.249 Statthalter Potocki 
also requested that Von Mondel would give full access to Ladislaus Ritter von Lozinski from the Gazeta 
Lwowska during the visit, as that newspaper was an important channel of the Galician government.250 
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 Stanczyk interpretation and goals of the Kaiserreise were made clear from the start. As 
mentioned in the introduction, on the first day of the emperor’s visit to Cracow, the Stanczyk 
newspaper CZAS published an editorial which described the Stanczyk perception of the relationship 
between Galicia and Cisleithania and argued in favour of Kaisertreue to a monarch who had enabled 
Galicia’s development and protected its freedom to be Polish. CZAS was normally published in Polish, 
but because the Stanczyks wanted to promote Galicia and the Polish Kaisertreu reputation to the 
reading public of the Dual Monarchy, this editorial was also published in German and copies were sent 
to other newspapers, like the Wiener Zeitung.251 In the article, Klobukowsku wrote on the “engste 
geistige und moralische Vereinigung, die ebenso den schönen polnischen Überlieferungen, als auch 
den grossen Traditionen des alten Habsburghauses entspricht.“252 And he praised Franz Joseph, stating 
that: 
 
“Der Monarch, den wir soeven empfangen sollen, war der erstte, der seinen polnischen 
Unterthanen wesentliches und volles Vertrauen entgegengebracht – und zwar vertraute 
er nicht blos ihrem Edelmuthe und ihrer Treue, sondern auch ihrer politischen Klugheit, 
und Opferwilligkeit; er hat ihnen nicht blos ihre angeborene Rechte zuerkannt, sondern 
er beruft sie auf seine Seite.“253 
 
Moreover, he claimed that because of this recognition, the Polish people would not need to be untrue 
to their “natürlichen Rechten und angeborenen Gefühlen […] und Er [the emperor] brachte das Alles 
in Einklang mit dem Wohle der Monarchie. Aus diese Art ermöglichte Er uns die Anknüpfung inniger, 
ja freundschaftlicher Verbindungen mit den anderen Völkern Oesterreichs.“ 
Franz Joseph was hailed as the monarch who had made it possible for the Poles freely use their 
language and culture, which in turn made them loyal to him and his realm and would allow them to be 
on friendly terms with the monarchy’s other nationalities. The goal of the editorial was to confirm the 
leading role of the Polish conservatives in Galicia and their policies, which had benefited.254  The 
implication was that Stanczyk Kaisertreu policies were both pro-Polish and pro-Austrian, and that this 
had secured autonomy and a consolidation and strengthening of Polish culture, while at the same time 
strengthening dynastic loyalty and the will to remain within the Austrian monarchy. The article 
therefore states: “Treu stehen wir zu Dir, treu wollen wir stehen für immer dar!“255 
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Other Stanczyk newspapers, like the Przegląd Polski, called the Kaiserreise as a “triumph of 
Stanczyk organisation and proved the success of conservative loyalism.”256 The crowds who cheered 
the emperor and the speeches of the Polish elites appeared to confirm the conservatives' vision and 
policies for achieving Polish interests within an autonomous Galicia.257 While Przegląd Polski spoke 
more broadly of the development of the Polish nation, CZAS’ review of the Kaiserreise focused on more 
concrete results of the cooperation between the Poles and Taaffe’s administration. The Cisleithanian 
policy of provincial autonomy had “brought toe Poles into the monarchy and its affairs and promised 
to lead to greater Polish control in Galicia and a strengthening of the state.”258 CZAS also compared the 
oppression of Polish culture in neighbouring Russian Poland to the relative freedom under the 
Habsburgs, lauded the emperor for allowing the Poles use of their own language in schools, church, 
and government, and as a symbol of successful Szlachta leadership of the Crownland. 
The Cisleithanian government and the Habsburg Court also considered the Kaiserreise a 
success. Von Mondel and Von Loebenstein’s reports had noted the emperor’s popularity with the 
Galician population and the authentic enthusiasm of the crowds.259 The imperial visit had improved 
the prestige of the dynasty and loyalty to the Austrian state in Galicia. 260  Government-friendly 
newspapers like the Wiener Zeitung and Fremden-Blatt and the conservative Das Vaterland all wrote 
on the Polish conservatives’ victory. The Fremden-Blatt argued that Statthalter Potocki and the 
emperor were both to be congratulated for the successful “Kaiserfest”261, which had strengthened the 
Austrianism of the Poles.  
 The Austro-German liberals opposed the Polish conservative narrative. The Austrian liberal 
press, the Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung and the Neue Freie Presse, used the Kaiserreise to accuse the 
Poles, and other allies of Taaffe’s Iron Ring, of destroying the unity of the state: “Die Verbindung 
derselben [the Polish] mit den Czechen und mit der conservativen deutschen Partei wird als 
verderblich für das Reich, für Galizien und für die polnische Nation bezeichnet.“262 Furthermore, they 
lambasted the Polish suppression of the Ruthenes263 and manipulating the imperial visit to strengthen 
Polish conservative control over the Crownland.264 Nevertheless, they too considered the imperial visit 
a success as Szlachta, peasants, Poles, Ruthenes, and Jews all stood together in showing their loyalty 
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to the imperial house.265 And even the Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung had to conclude that the Kaiserreise, 
with the wonderful festivities in Cracow and Lemberg, was not disrupted and that Austrianism was 
triumphant in Galicia.266 Furthermore, despite the fact that the redesignation of Wawel Castle was a 
triumph for the conservatives, the liberals praised this gesture, stating that: ”Bei der Ankunft des 
Kaisers in Krakau wird unseren Nationalen ein so kostbares Angebinde übergeben, daß dadurch die 
galizische Kaiserreise zu einem historischen Ereignisse nicht blos für das Kronland Galizien, sondern 
auch für alle Polen sich gestaltet.“267 
There were also critics of the imperial visit. The Polish democrats rejected the conservative 
narrative of natural Szlachta leadership in the liberal Gazeta Narodowa and Dziennik Polski, and 
oriented themselves more openly towards the Poles in German and Russian partitions. The liberals 
also denied that popular enthusiasm for the emperor was to be interpreted as public approval of the 
Stanczyk domination. 268  Despite the implication that this meant a “less enthusiastic embrace of 
imperial loyalty”, they did not oppose the emperor’s reception, as they also favoured a close 
relationship with the Taaffe administration, who might expand Galician autonomy.269  The Gazeta 
Narodowa stated clearly that “The Polish nation sees its interests in the attachment with Austria and 
its ruling dynasty”270 and on the first day of Franz Joseph’s visit it opened with a large printed ‘Na 
powitanie Monarchy’ (Welcome Monarch)271 Moreover, the newspaper compared the Poles in Galicia 
with those across the border in Russian Poland and concluded that the Austrian-Poles had come to 
“love and respect Franz Joseph because Austria alone among the partitioning powers had awarded the 
Poles enough freedom to develop themselves.”272  
 The Ruthenes contested the exclusive Polish representation of Galicia in the celebrations and 
saw this as evidence of oppression of the Ruthenian nationality. Their ability to host the emperor twice 
and the expressions of loyalty from the Ruthenes for the monarch, led them to declare the 1880 
Kaiserreise a success for the Ruthenian nation. They had distanced themselves from the Polish all-
Galician nature of the celebrations and demonstrated that their loyalty to dynasty and state was equal 
to that of the Poles.273 Interestingly, while the Stanczyks and other conservative Poles continually 
referred to imperial support for Galician autonomy, the Ruthenes looked to earlier times, like the 
1780’s and 1848.. They cherished the myth of the good emperor who “defends the common peoples 
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against their oppressors” emerged after the Joseph II’s reforms of the late 18th century which equalised 
the Greek Catholic church with the Roman Catholic one and moderated serfdom, and the current 
emperor who abolished serfdom in 1848 and donated land and money for the National Institute in 
1851.274 
 
4.4 Interpretation of Kaisertreue 
The ability of the 1880 imperial visit to promote Kaisertreue was due to three developments: 1) the 
emperor’s popularity and reputation as protector of national rights, 2) the consolidation of political 
social, and cultural dominance in Galicia by the Polish conservative elites, and 3) their participation in 
imperial institutions and loyalty to the monarch. Because of the combination of the monarch’s 
popularity and the search of the Polish conservatives to legitimise their vision for Galicia, they both 
had an interest in promoting Kaisertreue. The broad societal participation in the Kaiserreise 
demonstrates that the different loyalties could indeed be made compatible.275 
  However, despite the fact that the imperial visit met the goals of the Taaffe government and 
the Habsburg court, the reality was that the 1880 Kaiserreise was mainly a Polish affair, not a Habsburg 
one. The Stanczyk-conservative coalition had used the principle of Kaisertreue to gain rights, privileges, 
autonomy, and recognition of Polish nationhood, and they emphasised the emperor’s role in the 
‘Polish National Renaissance’ throughout the imperial visit. Franz Joseph’s visit was grasped by the 
ruling coalition to present a nationalist version of Galician history and to celebrate the Polish 
achievements under their/Habsburg rule, thereby aiming to cement their position and aristocratic rule 
within the Crownland.  
The Polish democrats had their criticisms and opposed conservative policies, but also praised 
the Crownland’s progress under Habsburg rule. The Ruthenes, on the other hand, more actively 
challenged the conservative Polish’ message in that they clearly presented themselves as a nation 
during the two Ruthene events in Lemberg. They tried to present themselves as being equally loyal to 
the monarch in order to gain recognition as a nation and to challenge the dominance of the 
conservative Poles. Nevertheless, they had to act within the framework set by the Polish conservatives. 
Both the Polish and Ruthene nationalist politicians nationalised their imperial loyalty as they 
linked him to their rights, their language, their culture, and their history. Loyalty to Franz Joseph had 
become a tool in their eyes. So, while the Court tried to present an anational emperor as the 
personification of the empire and the symbol of common history, prestige, and honour, while also 
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emphasising his new role as the protector of the equality of all his peoples, the Stanczyks and their 
conservative allies and the Ruthenes claimed Franz Joseph as an important character in their national 
narrative and tried to utilise his popularity to legitimate their aspirations. Kaisertreue was therefore 
interpreted in two different ways, which, during this Kaiserreise, were compatible and even mutually 
supportive. 
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5. Kaisertreue in Galicia 1894 
 
5.1 The different ambitions of 1894 
Franz Joseph returned several times to Galicia after the Kaiserreise of 1880. His visits were however to 
attend military manoeuvres and no massive celebrations were organised like in 1880. Likewise, the 
emperor’s five-day visit to the 1894 Wystawa krajowa powszechna, the Provincial Universal Exhibition, 
was also a smaller event than in 1880.276 Nevertheless, the Kaiserreise to Lemberg, and the subsequent 
military manoeuvres in Landskron, was the first visit to somewhat equal the 1880 tour and was also 
politically significant.277  
Like the earlier Kaiserreise and the military manoeuvres, this visit was meant to emphasise the 
close relationship between Franz Joseph and his subjects.278 Viennese newspapers did publish articles 
stating the importance of an imperial visit in linking the empire’s nationalities to the imperial state and 
the dynasty. The governmental Fremden-Blatt, for instance, wrote that: 
 
 “In the person of the emperor, the Empire itself appears in Lemberg. Can anyone doubt 
that this trip by the emperor will have a beneficial and lasting impact? Even the widest 
strata will become aware in a lively way of the inner identification with the Empire.”279 
 
However, the imperial visit was also meant to confirm the leadership role of the Polish conservatives 
and business people in pushing forward progress within the Crownland. 280  This was the specific 
intention of the new Cisleithanian government of Windisch-Grätz, which remained dependent on the 
Szlachta-dominated Polish Club in the Reichsrat for its majority after the Czechs had dropped their 
support for his predecessor, Graf Taaffe,  
This continued importance of Galician support is evidenced by the large deputation of 
ministers that accompanied the emperor on his visit. Not only did minister-president Windisch-Grätz 
himself join the monarch, also minister of the interior Olivier marquis Bacquehem, finance minister, 
and leader of the German liberals, Ernst von Plener, agriculture minister Julius Graf von Falkenhayn, 
trade minister Gundacker Graf von Wurmbrand, and the earlier mentioned minister for Galicia Von 
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Madeyski.281 This expresses the importance of Polish support for the continuance of Cisleithanian 
conservative rule and the policy of provincial national autonomy. The Fremden-Blatt further 
emphasised this Cisleithanian charm offensive by stating that the “understanding of the empire with 
the Poles, and the Poles with the empire [was] one of the great ideas adhered to by Franz Joseph in 
the constitutional era.”282 Moreover, it predicted that the Kaiserreise would showcase the patriotic 
cooperation of the Poles with other Old Austrian parties and the end of national tensions in the 
province. Other Viennese and Galician newspapers also printed favourable reviews of the exhibition 
in an effort to rouse public expressions of imperial loyalty as the Windisch-Grätz believed there would 
be advantages in gaining the attention of non-Galician Austrians for the exhibition. Statthalter Badeni 
agreed, stating that the exhibition could “strengthen and deepen the coalition idea in the 
consciousness of the population.”283 
 While the Stanczyk’s were still in control of most of Galicia’s institutions, they faced a growing 
opposition from the liberals who favoured industrialisation and stronger Polish-nation building 
policies. Badeni, who would become minister-president the following year, hoped the exhibition would 
provide a “much-needed distraction from the less constructive [Polish] national urge to mourn the 
partitions.” 284  The Stanczyk programme was to better the economic, political, and cultural 
circumstances of the Galicians. They relished Polish culture, history, traditions, and heritage in order 
to strengthen the Polish nation and Galicia, but they opposed the liberal weltschmerz on the Polish 
partitions. The Stanczyks and their conservative allies wanted to work towards a better Polish future 
within the Habsburg imperial framework and to stop looking melancholically to the past in which 
Poland was independent. Sapieha himself said that the exhibition’s goal was to portray the Polish 
nation “in the prime of its life” and that it looked towards the future “with a healthy gaze”.285  
 However, by 1894 there had been political changes in Galicia. The Polish conservatives still 
dominated the Sejm and the Reichsrat delegation, but they became less able to unify the Galician 
population behind their vision of Polish progress and imperial loyalty. 286 The conservative vision of the 
Szlachta as the ‘natural ruling elite’ was no longer commonly accepted by the population. Polish civil 
society developed with publications, associations, and celebrations which led to the mobilisation of 
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the peasantry and urbanised masses. New newspapers were established, such as the Wieniec (Crown), 
Pszczólka (the Bee), Swiazek Chlopski (the Peasant Association), and the Przyjaciel Ludu (the Friend of 
the People). In 1893 this was followed with establishment of the Związek Stronnictwa Chlopskiego, the 
Union of the Peasant Party.  
Besides the strengthened opposition of the Polish liberals and upcoming Peasant Party, the 
Stanczyk-conservative coalition was faced by the rising of social-democracy in the countryside which 
challenged the interests of the aristocrats by calling for economic, social, and political reforms287; and 
Russophiles and Ukrainophiles, who were actively seeking support amongst the Ruthenes. They too 
intended to use the exhibition to propagate their own visions for Galicia and called upon their 
constituents to visit it and to rally against conservative ‘servility’ to the Austrians, the abandonment of 
Polish national goals, or aristocratic rule.288  
 
5.2 The 1894 Provincial Universal Exhibition 
Following the World Exhibition in Vienna (1873) in which Galicia had participated as a Crownland, and 
the subsequent Land Exhibitions in Lemberg (1877) and Cracow (1887), a committee led by Prince 
Adam Sapieha, including the new Statthalter of Galicia, Kasimir Graf von Badeni, decided on June 29 
1892 to organise the Galician Provincial Universal Exhibition in Lemberg.289 Franz Joseph gave his 
patronage to the exhibition and it was planned at the centennial anniversary of the Polish Kosciuszko 
Uprising of 1794 against the Prussians and Russians.290 Moreover, it was to show off Galicia‘s economic 
and cultural progress since its autonomy in thirty-four areas, ranging from fine arts to oil production, 
forestry to publishing.291 The themes were designed to show the growth in Galicia’s spiritual and 
material aspects, especially for the common folk. Besides the economy and Polish history, the 
exhibition also had sections demonstrating the development of Galicia’s financial institutions, its public 
administration, and its politics.292 
 The costs were significant, as large as the annual budget for Cracow, as the exhibition had to 
cover 129 pavilions, restaurants, coffee shops, and bakeries in a fifty-hectare piece of land next to 
Kilinski Park. A new sewer system had to be set up, an electric tramline had to be built from Lemberg’s 
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centre to the exhibition, native regional peasant dwellings were erected, and the Palace of Art and the 
mausoleum for Jan Matejko, the Polish nationalist painter, had to be constructed.293 
The exhibition’s grand opening was done on June 5th by archduke Carl Ludwig, the younger 
brother of Franz Joseph.294 Committee chairman Sapieha then spoke in Polish and, in order to show 
that the exhibition would also represent Galicia’s Ruthenes, Dr. Damyan Sawchak, a member of the 
committee, held a speech in Ukrainian.295 The Galician exhibition lasted for four months, until October 
16th, and was visited by over one million people, approximately ten times the population of Lemberg296, 
including the emperor himself. Moreover, according to telegrams send to Von Loebenstein, who was 
still in the employ of the Habsburg Court and now had the title Regierungsrath, there would also be a 
Russian and Rumanian governmental delegation present when the emperor visited the exhibition., 
indicating its international status, and maybe in the case of Russia, a political sensitiveness.297 
 Unlike during the celebrations of 1880, more attention was given to reconcile the Poles with 
the Ruthenes. Since becoming Statthalter in 1888, Badeni had attempted to find a compromise with 
the Young Ruthenes and his membership of the committee might have influenced the choice of 
Lemberg over Cracow since this “downplayed the exposition’s Polishness.”298 The Polish conservatives 
therefore did no longer exclusively emphasize the Polish heritage and nation in Galicia and made some 
room for the Ruthenes in presenting Galicia. A member of the committee, for instance, gave a speech 
in Ukrainian at the opening and closing ceremonies, and during the emperor’s visit. Sawczak’s speeches 
and presence not only made sure attention was given to the Ruthenes, it also enabled the emperor to 
fulfil his role as patron of all nationalities and praise the work of both Galician communities, and their 
“concerted cooperation.”299 
 Yet the exhibition was not without its pan-Polish elements. While the vast majority of the 
exhibitors came from Austrian Galicia, quite a number came from other Polish lands abroad. Moreover, 
the grand Raclawice Panorama, a main attraction in the exhibition, was specifically created for the 
exhibition to emphasize Polish history and nationality. It was a panorama painting representing the 
Polish peasants victory in the battle of Raclawice against Russian imperial troops and it was meant to 
instil the over 200.000 visitors with a Polish national consciousness.300 
As patron of the exhibition, Franz Joseph visited Lemberg and the exhibition between 7 and 11 
September. Like in 1880, the programme for the Kaiserreise was designed by the conservative coalition 
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and the Statthalterei and a citizens’ guard was organised, associations and corporations were assigned 
roles. During his stay, Franz Joseph witnessed thousands welcoming his arrival in the Crownland’s 
capital and as he toured the exhibition. Besides his daily visits to the exhibition he also visited schools, 
churches, and institutions, reviewed a parade held before him by Lemberg’s citizenry, and received 
petitions. While in 1880 these petitions had partly been dealt with by Court officials and partly by the 
Galician institutions, for 1894 there were no references made within the Direktionsakten of the 
Kabinettskanzlei about petitions that were looked into by the Court. These were probably dealt with 
by the Statthalterei. Furthermore, like in 1880, Franz Joseph also made a gesture towards the Ruthenes 
by visiting some of ‘their’ institutions and receptions, like one at the Greek Catholic Seminary.301  
Nevertheless, despite the more concessional attitude of the Polish conservatives towards the 
Ruthenes, the Statthalterei and the Cisleithanian ministry of the interior still feared some opposition 
to the status quo by the liberals, nationalists and socialists, which could lead to unwanted actions that 
would hinder the goals of the visit. Measures were therefore taken to prevent this. 302  A Social 
Democratic mass rally on September 9th in Lemberg to pressure the present Cisleithanian ministers 
into accepting election reforms, was for instance banned by the police in the name of public security.303 
 
5.3 Political and national perspectives 
The German-Austrian newspaper coverage was still dominated by the liberal, conservative, and 
governmental press. As the conservatives, the Polish Club, and the liberals formed a grand-coalition 
supporting the administration of Windisch-Grätz, they were generally very positive about the 
exhibition, the reception of the emperor, and the success of the Polish conservatives policies. 304 
Nevertheless, they published from different perspectives. The Austro-German liberals for instance 
interpreted the exhibition as an Austrian, rather than Galician, success, and they welcomed the 
Kaiserreise as a turning point in liberal-conservative relations.305 The liberal Neues Wiener Zeitung, 
which normally was quite anti-Szlachta, wrote, for instance, that the exhibition was “ein glänzender 
Erfolg der culturellen Bestrebungen Galiziens, eine feireliche Gutheißung der polnischen Politik 
zugleich aber die schärfste Betonung der gesammtstaatlichen Idee, und der moderner Geist – in diese 
knappe Formel läßt sich die Bedeutung der Kaiserreiche nach Galizien zusammenfassen.”306 The liberal 
press further emphasized the Kaisertreue oft he Galician population. The Neue Freie Presse, for 
instance, wrote about the Galician masses‘ dynastic loyalty “die so großartig und zugleich so innig und 
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zum Herzen sprechend sind, daß es kaum einen andern Souverän in Europa geben dürfte.”307 And Die 
Presse wrote that:  
 
 “Wer diese lemberger Tage miterlebt hat, wer Zeuge dessen sein durfte, wie echt und 
warm , wie aufrichtig und wie aus dem tiefsten Herzen quellend diese Manifestationen 
waren, der musste sich sagen, dass dieses Land und dieses Volk kaisertreu und Schwarz-
gelb bis auf das Mark der Knochen ist und dass die auf mancher Seite so gern 
festgehaltene Fabel von dem kalten Vernunftpatriotismus der Pole nein- für allemal 
aufgegeben werden muss.“308 
 
From their perspective, the conservative papers often published about the success of Galician 
autonomy and the Polish conservatives, Franz Joseph’s role in the development of the Crownland, and 
his ability to bridge political and national differences. Das Vaterland argued for example that, even 
though the feeling of unity and belonging was already significant, “durch die gemeinsame Begeisterung 
für den Herrscher einen über wältigenden Impuls erhielt” and that the imperial visit “zu einem Feste 
des Volkes in des Wortes höchster und edelster Bedeutung geworden [ist], an welchen zugleich mit 
dem Herrscher alle Schichten der beiden Nationen des Landes theilnahmen.” 309  Moreover, the 
governmental press was especially emphasizing the loyalty of the Szlachta.310  
Interestingly, the Polish patriotic overtones of the exhibition were almost completely passed 
over in the German press, but a part of the Cisleithanian opposition, i.e. the socialists, the clerical 
Christian-Socials, and the German-nationals, was much more critical or negative of Szlachta leadership, 
the Poles, and the exhibition. Nevertheless, in 1894 most of these were still quite marginal forces.311 
 In Galicia itself, Franz Joseph’s visit to the exhibition was covered extensively by newspaper 
supportive of the Stanczyk vision and policies. The Galician government’s Gazeta Lwowska printed 
photographs and illustrations of the emperor and documented his every word and movement during 
his five-day stay in Lemberg, while CZAS accredited the close relationship between the Crown and the 
Szlachta for the Crownland’s economic and technological development, as showcased in the 
exhibition.312 They quoted the emperor as saying to the president of the exhibition Sapieha, that “we 
[the Habsburgs] can always count on you [the Poles].”  
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 The opposition in the Sejm and the Crownland was both positive and negative about the 
exhibition and the Kaiserreise, based on their stances. Polish nationalists, like Wojciech Graf von 
Dzieduszycki, a Polish writer and conservative politician who opposed Stanczyk policies, were quite 
positive, claiming that the exhibition was evidence of the maturity of the Poles and their contribution 
to the “well-being of the empire as a whole” and that the Poles best knew “how to reconcile the needs 
of the nations with the interests of the state.”313 Moreover, they favourably compared Galicia under 
Austrian rule to that of the Poles in Russia and lauded the development of the Polish nation under 
Franz Joseph’s reign, just like in 1880. 
 However, as the political landscape was changing in 1894, imperial loyalty was no longer 
uniting all quarters of Galician society. Franz Joseph was still hailed by massive crowds, but this was 
mainly due to his personal popularity.314 The things he represented, like the Dual Monarchy and elite 
Szlachta-conservative rule in Galicia, meant that Kaisertreue could no longer bridge all political and 
social divisions. Some Galician newspapers like the socialist Naprzód, the democratic Nowa Reforma, 
the liberal-leftist Kurjer Lwowski, and the Ruthenian nationalist Dilo an Halyczanin were even 
confiscated for lèse majesté.315 
   
5.4 Interpretation of Kaisertreue 
By 1894 the convergence of factors which had resulted to the ability of the 1880 Kaiserreise to 
transform Kaisertreue into popular legitimacy for Stanczyk-conservative visions and policies for Galicia, 
had broken down. The promotion of Kaisertreue depended on the cooperation of political elites and 
the penetration of ideas into broader segments of society by means of communication, symbols, 
institutions, and the formation of a group identity. Franz Joseph’s personal popularity remained very 
high and large crowds continued to line the streets and cheer him during his arrival or his visits. For 
the Polish conservative-coalition the monarch therefore remained attractive as a means to legitimise 
their own vision and policies.  
 The Court continued to promote Kaisertreue in an anational way by portraying Franz Joseph 
as the patron of national equality. But while his visits to Ruthene institutions, his speech recognising 
the exhibition as resulting from the cooperation between the two Galician communities, and his 
support for the Stanczyk-conservative coalition found its way into the Viennese and Galician pro-
governmental newspapers, there was an increasing critical attitude from other Galician political 
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movements which opposed aristocratic rule, wanted election reforms, or more socioeconomic 
equality. 
The rise of these movements challenged Stanczyk-conservative ability to translate Kaisertreue 
into popular acceptance of their visions and policies or their claims to define Polish national interests 
and to speak for the Galician population. The coalition’s rule over Galicia was contested by the 1890’s 
was not just by the Polish Democrats, but also growing sections of Galician society, united in new 
socialist and nationalist movements, who were not/no longer content to seek fulfilment of their 
national or socioeconomic interests through the mediation of the conservative elites. Their opposition 
focused on the Stanczyk-conservative narrative of a united Polish Galician society, natural Szlachta 
rule, and imperial loyalty. 
The Polish conservatives still dominated most Galician institutions and therefore controlled 
the message of the Kaiserreise through the newspapers and propagated the narrative of a Polish 
Galicia with conservative beneficial leadership and Kaisertreue. Its penetrating effect was however 
seriously limited by the publication of new, more critical, newspapers, which made controlling the 
communication difficult. Moreover, because Polish and imperial symbolism and Stanczyk dominated 
institutions were no longer accepted by some, using them to bolster legitimacy caused more division 
than unity in Galician society. The successful organisation of the social democrats, the Polish liberals, 
and Ruthene nationalists, had undermined the ability of the Polish conservatives to utilise Kaisertreue 
to their benefits. The fact that dynastic loyalty could no longer work for pragmatic/accommodative 
nationalist politicians to bridge social, political, and nationalist differences lessened its use for them to 
unite the population behind their policies and visions.  
The Court’s anationalist and the Stanczyk-conservative’s nationalist promotion of Kaisertreue 
was thus challenged in 1894 due to a changing political landscape and the rise of new movements 
representing liberal and socioeconomic interests. Nevertheless, the monarchy and, in particular, Franz 
Joseph were still very popular and could rely on massive public approval, as evidenced by the massive 
crowds and press attention during the Kaiserreisen. In the 1890s an activist of the Polish Socialist Party 
complained about the Poles’ disturbing embrace of the dynasty, by writing that: “The widespread cult 
of the Habsburg dynasty reached village homes, where portraits of the emperor and empress, bought 
for groschen at the bazaar, were hung on the walls, in bookshops and general stores. It was the fashion 
to have porcelain plates, mugs, pipes with busts of the imperial family, post cards of the imperial palace 
in Vienna and prints of the emperor and his family.”316  
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Conclusion 
 
Since Jászi’s the Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy was published in 1929, historians have debated 
on the power of centripetal forces versus centrifugal forces in the Austro-Hungarian empire in order 
to explain its disintegration at the end of the First World War. It has not been until recently that this 
assumption of the mutual exclusiveness between national consciousness and imperial loyalty has been 
put to the question. New studies have concluded that that people can have multiple loyalties at the 
same time and that nationalist interests could be made compatible within the imperial framework. 
Moreover, in some cases these forces could even support and strengthen each other. 
 Nevertheless, most historians have continued to interpret the concept of Kaisertreue from a 
centripetal macro-perspective, without attention for the dynamics and interaction between the 
imperial centre and the Crownland elites/peoples. Unowsky has come very close, but his research is 
mainly one of the compatibility between imperial loyalty and nationalism and has not led to a 
reinterpretation of Kaisertreue. 
 Based on the semasiologic ideas of conceptual history that words can have various 
interpretations at the same time and influences political and social groups differently. With this in mind 
and the new developments in the historiography which have changed historians’ dichotomous 
perspectives, this thesis has therefore argued that the concept should be reinterpreted. Besides the, 
classic, anational perspective it should also be analysed from a national perspective. This 
reinterpretation of Kaisertreue is needed in order to create a better understanding what it meant to 
different political and social groups and how they tried to utilise imperial loyalty or reacted to it. 
Additionally, by having a better comprehension of the concept, historians can offer new insights into 
the nationalist-imperial dynamics within the Dual Monarchy. 
The analysis of the two Kaiserreisen by Franz Joseph to Galicia in 1880 and 1894 has shown 
that a reinterpretation of Kaisertreue is warranted. Both were planned from the Galician Stanczyk-
conservative coalition’s perspective of strengthening Polish support for the empire and the dynasty, 
while at the same time utilising the populations’ dynastic loyalty to legitimise their vision and policies 
for Galicia. This ‘national hijack’ of the emperor by incorporating them in their nationalist narrative 
and using the Kaisertreue of the population for their own political goals was at odds with the Viennese 
promotion of the anational monarch who was not exclusive to one nationality and who did not support 
one over the other. The anational promotion rested on Franz Joseph’s reputation as the guarantor and 
protector of the equality of all nationalities, their languages, and their cultures. However, because the 
Habsburg Court coordinated the visit with the Polish conservatives and agreed with them on also 
visiting Ruthenian institutions, the emperor could perform is role as the wise and caring patron of all 
his subjects. Because of the interaction between Court and nationalist elites the Kaiserreise could fulfil 
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both groups goals: enhancing dynastic loyalty and the monarch’s popularity, increasing loyalty to the 
imperial state, and to confirm Polish conservative leadership over Galicia. Imperial-nationalist 
interactions could therefore be mutually beneficial.  
Franz Joseph’s visits to St. Georges and the National Home did on the other hand support the 
Ruthene national cause. Ruthenian organisations used the imperial visit to legitimise their national 
vision and make themselves visible as another nationality within the empire. The visit enabled them 
to oppose Polish domination, while continue to appear/remain Kaisertreu to the monarch who had 
ended serfdom and who they considered to be ‘the good old emperor’. Moreover, the Ruthenes 
considered it a national pride that the monarch visited ‘their’ institutions and heard speeches in ‘their’ 
national language. Franz Joseph was therefore a powerful symbol, one that could utilised as symbol 
for a Polish and Ruthenian national success stories or used in the classic anational (imperial) sense 
during both Kaiserreisen. 
During the second visit, the Galician political landscape had changed with the rise of the Social 
Democrats, National Democrats, and Ruthenian nationalists. The ruling Stanczyk-conservative 
coalition now had to compete, not only with the liberals, but also with political movements with 
increasing constituencies. Opposition to the conservatives also meant opposing their vision of a Polish 
(Szlachta dominated) Galicia and Habsburg loyalty. The close relationship between monarch and elites 
and imperial support for elite rule was questioned and opposed. While the Habsburg Court continued 
to promote anational Kaisertreue by having Franz Joseph again visit Ruthene institutions and 
organisations, and Franz Joseph’s personal popularity continued to attract large numbers of Galicians 
for his 1894 Kaiserreise, he could no longer be used to validate Polish conservative leadership in all 
quarters of society by the Stanczyk-conservatives.  
 This analysis confirms that Prokopovych’ assumption on ‘one identity, multiple loyalties’ has 
merit. The Polish conservatives, and to some extent the liberals, fit Comisso’s category of 
pragmatist/accommodative nationalists who were willing to support the imperial framework as a 
means to achieve national development. While their loyalty was foremost to their own nation, 
heritage, language, and wellbeing, the empire was perceived as a useful framework to achieve these 
interests. Kaisertreue was therefore interpreted by them, from a nationalist perspective, as something 
that could be used and made compatible with nationalism to legitimise and strengthen their nationalist 
aspirations. The centre on the other hand interpreted Kaisertreue in an anational sense that would not 
politicise nationality, language, culture, or ethnicity, but that promoted the ruler as the guarantor of a 
community of interests in which all could equally co-exist.  
The question to what extent there was a different interpretation of Kaisertreue between the 
Habsburg Court/Cisleithanian government and the Galician elites has therefore shown to be true. The 
anational interpretation was of less use to the Polish nationalists, so they reinterpreted the concept as 
 
65 Franz Joseph utilised? 
to suit their visions and policies. Through this reinterpretation of Kaisertreue, this thesis has tried to 
break through the singular perception of dynastic loyalty as a purely centripetal force. The dynamics 
between imperial centre and the Crownlands were much more complex than can be argued from a 
dynasty versus nationalist assumption. By looking at Kaisertreue from different angles, historians can 
better explain the complex developments in the Austro-Hungarian empire.  
 One interesting development that might warrant more research, is the possibility of a third 
interpretation of Kaisertreue, one that was neither national or anational. Some political groups and 
their constituents opposed the association of dynastic loyalty with loyalty to the empire as a whole, 
elite rule, or the nation within the empire. Their interests were much more socioeconomic in the sense 
that they favoured the extension of the franchise, more economic equality etc. Their constituents 
nevertheless still went to see and cheer Franz Joseph. One could therefore argue that Solomon Wanks 
interpretation of Kaisertreue as a strictly personal popularity to the monarch, not the dynasty or the 
empire as a whole, has merit to some extent. For some quarters of society Kaisertreue had changed 
into a more personal loyalty without the nationalist or anationalist connotations of the Court, the 
Cisleithanian government, and the Stanczyk-conservative coalition.  
 This change could be linked to Comisso’s fifth category: the anationality of the masses, whose 
loyalties are not based on the empire or their nationality, but on their socioeconomic interests, class, 
occupation, or religion. While Franz Joseph retained significant personal popularity, some parts of 
society became indifferent towards Kaisertreue’s political messages. This would mean that there is 
also a third interpretation of Kaisertreue: the personal one. This however needs more historical 
research on the stances of the different political movements versus the monarch, the Dual Monarchy, 
and their constituents’ loyalties. 
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